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The Myth of Morrison: Securities Fraud Litigation
Against Foreign Issuers
Robert Bartlett*
Matthew D. Cain**
Jill E. Fisch***
Steven Davidoff Solomon****
Draft Dated: November 12, 2018
Abstract
Using a sample of 388 securities fraud lawsuits filed between 2002 and 2017 against foreign
issuers, we examine the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank. We find that the description of Morrison as a “steamroller” substantially ending litigation
against foreign issuers is a myth. Instead, we find that Morrison did not substantially change the
type of litigation brought against foreign issuers, which both before and after Morrison focused on
foreign issuers with a U.S. listing and substantial U.S. trading volume. While dismissal rates rose
post-Morrison we find no evidence that this is related to the decision. Settlement amounts and
attorneys’ fees actually rose post-Morrison. We use these findings to theorize that Morrison was
primarily a preemptive decision about standing that firmly delineated the exposure of foreign
issuers to U.S. liability in response to the Vivendi case, which sought to expand the scope of
liability for foreign issuers to include those that traded primarily on non-U.S. venues. When
Morrison is placed in its true context it is justified as a decision in-line with prior administrative
and court actions which have historically aligned firms’ U.S. liability to be proportional with their
U.S. presence. While Morrison had this defining effect it did not change the litigation environment
for foreign issuers, the oft-cited import of the decision. More generally, our analysis of Morrison
also underscores how the decision has been mistakenly interpreted as a case primarily about
extraterritoriality rather than about standing.
Introduction
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.1 has been described as a “steamroller”,
substantially paring back the ability of private litigants to sue foreign companies for securities
fraud.2 In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b), the general antifraud provision
*
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561 U.S. 247 (2010).
2
See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Securities Law Ruling Creates Unintended Problems, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, June
1, 2012, available at https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/securities-law-ruling-created-more-problems-than-itsolved/. See also Joseph Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 Liability, and
**
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of the Securities Act of 1934, does not apply extraterritorially in a private cause of action
brought under Rule 10b-5. Rather, the Court stated that “Section 10(b) reaches the use of a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in
the United States.”3
The Morrison decision circumscribed the scope of liability under Rule 10b-5. Under prior
case law, a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 in connection with securities purchased
abroad was possible provided the plaintiff satisfied the “conduct” or “effects” test.4 Morrison
rejected this standard and eliminated the ability for investors who purchased securities outside
the United States to bring a private claim under Rule 10b-5.5 More importantly, even for U.S.
investors, Morrison eliminated their ability to be a part of a global class action suit brought under
Rule 10b-5 against non-U.S. firms to the extent these investors acquired their securities abroad.
Commentators argued that Morrison was necessary to reduce the exposure of foreign
issuers to costly and burdensome private securities litigation in the United States.6 Some argued
that this exposure was causing foreign issuers to delist their securities in the U.S.7 As one
commentator explained, “non-U.S. issuers were leaving U.S. capital markets, in large part
because of fear of private securities litigation in the United States.”8
In the wake of Morrison, defense attorneys’ and companies crowed, as investors holding
billions of dollars of securities were dismissed from Rule 10b-5 class action suits pending against
non-U.S. issuers.9 Morrison is widely understood as reducing the litigation risk for foreign
issuers, and the decision has been characterized as potentially “encourage[ing] non-U.S. issuers
to continue to list their shares on U.S. exchanges and strengthen U.S. capital markets.”10 The
Morrison decision has been credited with transforming “the way the federal courts look at
Prospects for Regulatory Reform, 41 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2015) (“In [Morrison] the Supreme Court
revolutionized the application of U.S. securities laws to international transactions.”).
3
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.
4
We discuss the previous “conduct” and “effects” test infra at notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
5
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273.
6
The percentage of securities fraud suits against foreign-headquartered companies grew in the years prior to
Morrison. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1173, 1177
n. 2 (2012) (“Federal securities class actions against foreign issuers represented 17% of all actions filed in both 2007
and 2008”).
7
See, e.g., Robert J. Giuffra, The Territorial Reach of U.S. Securities Laws After Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, Oct. 13, 2011,
available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/10/13/the-territorial-reach-of-u-s-securities-laws-after-morrisonv-national-australia-bank/ (citing substantial number of issuers delisting from the U.S. markets between 2007 and
2009); Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud Litigation after Morrison v. National Australia Bank:
Reconsidering a Reliance-based Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 Harv. Int. L.J. 502, 536 (2012) (reporting “a
2007 survey conducted by the Financial Services Forum found that senior executives from nine of ten foreign
companies who delisted from the United States between 2003 and 2007 said that litigation risk was a factor in their
delisting”).
8
Id.
9
Michael D. Goldhaber, The Short Arm of the (U.S.) Law, CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2012, at 28.
10
Giuffra, supra note 7. Our view, as developed below, is that Morrison did not substantially change the landscape
for liability of foreign firms listing their securities in the United States but rather defined the scope of liability with
more circumspection, allowing for a more precise listing decision.
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transnational securities litigation”11 and with adopting a more restrained approach to the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
But is this true?
In this paper, we examine the effect of Morrison eight years after its publication, taking
stock of both its practical implications for issuers and investors and what it tells us about the
proper role of U.S. federal courts in exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. We analyze pre- and
post-Morrison litigation empirically and find that dramatic claims about Morrison’s impact are
largely a myth. Morrison did not substantially change the exposure of foreign issuers to federal
securities fraud litigation or change the types of issuers who faced U.S. litigation. Nor were
settlement amounts significantly different after Morrison in 10b-5 cases brought against foreign
issuers. Even where the decision had its greatest impact -- the composition of the plaintiff class
– we find that U.S. exchange trading in defendant firms before Morrison was sufficiently robust
that pre-Morrison cases could have pled an investor class that would have satisfied its
transactional test. While Morrison may have put an end to the “global class action,” prior to
Morrison, such cases were a rarity.
In Part I, we briefly describe the institutional context in which Morrison arose – the
increasing globalization of the capital markets and its implications for securities fraud class
actions. We then discuss the Morrison decision and the divergent commentary describing its
impact. Some commentators have defended Morrison as halting a new wave of securities fraud
litigation against foreign issuers that seemingly imposed U.S. federal law on foreign capital
markets. Other have faulted Morrison for reducing the scope of securities law protections for
U.S. investors.
In Part II, we seek to evaluate the effect of Morrison empirically on federal securities
fraud litigation involving foreign issuers. We examine a sample of 388 lawsuits alleging a
violation of Rule 10b-5 that were filed between 2002 and 2017 against foreign issuers – issuers
that are headquartered outside the United States.12 We observe that many suits filed in the U.S.
involve foreign issuers whose securities trade exclusively on U.S. stock exchanges. 13 As we
explain below, previous commentators have not focused on these cases. Importantly, however,
because of the jurisdictional rule adopted by the Court, the Morrison decision should not affect
them. For this reason, our core analyses examine the sample of cases brought against foreign
firms whose securities traded on at least one non-U.S. exchange. We refer to those firms in this
11

George T. Conway, Morrison at Four: A Survey of Its Impact on Securities Litigation, U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE
at 15 (2014).
12
We note that our definition of foreign issuer differs from “foreign private issuer” which is a defined term under
the federal securities laws - Rule 405 of Regulation C under the Securities Act and Rule 3b-4 under the Exchange
Act. Foreign private issuer status is determined by the relative degree to which a company’s voting securities are
held by U.S. investors and the extent of its U.S. business contacts. The SEC has adopted a variety of rules designed
to reduce the U.S. regulatory burden on foreign private issuers. See, e.g., SEC, Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets - A Brief Overview of Foreign Private Issuers, dated Feb. 13, 2013, available at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-private-issuers-overview.shtml. Notably, the SEC has been
careful to ensure that none of these rules limit the scope of liability for foreign issuers under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. See Brett Carron & Steven Davidoff, Getting U.S. Security Holders to the Party: The SEC’s Cross-Border
Release Five Years On, 12 U. PENN J. INT'L ECON. L. 455, 480 (2005).
13
Notably, these issuers are unlikely to qualify under the SEC’s definition as foreign private issuers, as well.
FOR LEGAL REFORM,
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paper as “Foreign Listed Firms.” We focus our attention on them on the theory that this is where
Morrison’s transactional test is likely to have the most impact.14
We explore several questions. Did Morrison reduce the likelihood that a Foreign Listed
Firm would face a securities fraud class action in the United States? Did Morrison change the
type of Foreign Listed Firm that was sued in U.S. courts? Did Morrison reduce the size or scope
of litigation against Foreign Listed Firms through smaller settlements and lower fee awards for
class counsel – reductions that would reduce the incentives for plaintiffs to bring future cases?
By determining the extent of these effects, if any, we evaluate Morrison’s impact.
We note at the outset that, as with any study examining the effect of Morrison on
securities litigation, we face an important obstacle in that we lack a counter-factual reality in
which Morrison never occurred.15 As such, we lack a means to determine whether the cases
against Foreign Listed Firms that we observe after Morrison would have looked any different
absent the decision. To overcome this challenge, we exploit the bright-line character of
Morrison’s ruling and initially focus on the pre-Morrison period to identify the consequences of
Morrison’s transactional test on those 10b-5 cases that were brought against Foreign Listed
Firms. In particular, because it was arguably easier for plaintiffs to bring transnational cases in
U.S. courts before Morrison, the pre-Morrison period functions as our “control” setting for
where Morrison does not apply. Additionally, the bright-line character of the Morrison rule
permits us to estimate which pre-Morrison plaintiffs would have failed this test, thus enabling us
to ask how cases brought before Morrison would have fared when “treated” with the Morrison
rule.
Using this approach, we analyze the extent to which Morrison changed the type of nonU.S. firms subjected to a class action suit under Rule 10b-5. Our findings are perhaps
surprising.16
The first question we analyze is the impact of Morrison on overall litigation risk against
Foreign Listed Firms. For Morrison to address the concern that foreign issuers were being
targeted too frequently, it should have reduced their litigation exposure. One of the driving
14

Our choice to focus on foreign firms that have their securities traded on at least one non-U.S. exchange has the
effect of excluding from our core analyses those 10b-5 suits commenced against non-U.S. issuers whose sole trading
venue was either a U.S. exchange or the over-the-counter market. We exclude these firms from our core analyses
because Morrison did not change their overall exposure to a Rule 10b-5 class action suit. For instance, in the case of
foreign firms that traded solely on a U.S. exchange, all investors would satisfy Morrison’s transactional test, and in
the case of foreign firms that traded only on the over-the-counter market, investors would be unable to bring a fraudon-the-market claim either before or after Morrison.
15
In addition, various factors unrelated to Morrison may have affected the litigation environment subsequent to
2010, perhaps most notably, the lingering effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Although we cannot control for these
changes, we report general descriptive statistics of overall securities litigation in an effort to identify their potential
impact.
16
[This sentence seems to be missing something…]Although other commentators have observed that, despite
Morrison’s hype, it does not appear to have reduced securities fraud litigation against foreign issuers. See, e.g.,
David Topol & Margaret Thomas, Post-Morrison Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Foreign Issuers, THE D&O
DIARY, Mar. 6, 2017, available at https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/03/articles/securities-litigation/guest-postpost-morrison-application-u-s-securities-laws-foreign-issuers/ (observing that, despite Morrison, “filings against
foreign issuers continue to increase each year”).
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forces behind Morrison was the idea that foreign firms with no connection to the U.S. were being
targeted with burdensome U.S. litigation. We thus theorize that prior to Morrison, plaintiffs did
not focus on whether an issuer had a U.S. listing, but that Morrison’s requirement that Rule 10b5 actions be limited to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic
transactions in other securities” should have caused plaintiffs to focus their efforts on foreign
firms that had securities listed on a U.S. exchange.
Consistent with this position, we confirm that class action suits against foreign issuers
after Morrison were almost entirely confined to those issuers having a U.S. exchange listing at
some point during the class period. Moreover, conditional on a firm having a U.S. exchange
listing, Rule 10b-5 cases brought after Morrison consistently defined a class period that fully
coincided with the period when the issuer maintained its U.S. listing. However, surprisingly, the
focus of filed cases on firms with a U.S. listing did not represent a significant shift from the preMorrison era. Ninety percent of pre-Morrison cases were filed against Foreign Listed Firms
with a U.S. exchange listing, and nearly all of them alleged a class period that fully coincided
with the period when the issuer maintained its U.S. listing. Moreover, although roughly 10% of
pre-Morrison cases against Foreign Listed Firms were against firms that lacked any U.S.
exchange listing, that percentage is statistically indistinguishable from the fraction of postMorrison defendants in our sample that lacked any U.S. exchange listing during the class
period.17 Thus, we find that Morrison did not change the type of firm likely to be sued.
For Foreign Listed Firms having a U.S. exchange listing, we further examine the dollar
volume of trading on U.S. exchanges relative to their domestic, local exchanges during the class
period. Because Morrison limits the class of Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs to those who acquired
securities on a U.S. exchange, the decision should have reduced the risk of Rule 10b-5 litigation
for Foreign Listed Firms having low volumes of U.S-exchange trading because it reduced the
level of recoverable Rule 10b-5 damages. For similar reasons, Foreign Listed Firms having
higher levels of U.S. trading volume should be more attractive Rule 10b-5 defendants, all else
equal. Within our sample, there does appear to be some evidence of this dynamic. The median
volume of U.S. exchange trading among these firms during the class period in post-Morrison
cases was $11.8 billion, compared to $4.95 billion before it.18 Yet our data also reveal that both
before and after Morrison, cases were routinely brought against Foreign Listed Firms whose U.S.
trading volume was substantially less than these amounts. For instance, following Morrison,
there were Rule 10b-5 actions filed against Foreign Listed Firms with a U.S. exchange trading
volume of just $1.8 million over the entire the class period—an amount that was less than the
U.S. dollar volume of trading for the class period of every pre-Morrison Rule 10b-5 defendant
that maintained a U.S. exchange listing. In combination, these findings undermine claims that
10b-5 cases prior to Morrison focused on Foreign Listed Firms having little or no connection to
the U.S. capital markets, or that Morrison substantially changed the composition of Rule 10b-5
defendants.
Finally, we assess overall trends with respect to case outcomes and attorneys’ fees during
our sample period. Overall, we find limited evidence of differences in settlement and dismissal
rates. Dismissal rates increased slightly after Morrison, but the dismissals do not appear to be
17
18

In both cases, the defendants’ securities traded in the U.S. over-the-counter market.
Dollar figures throughout this paper have been inflation-adjusted using the CPI index to reflect 2018 prices.
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predicated on the Morrison issue. The median settlement amount actually increased from $13
million to over $15 million. This latter result contrasts with prior work which found a decline in
both mean and median settlement amounts following Morrison.19 Among 10b-5 suits against
Foreign Listed Firms, we also find that overall attorneys’ fees awarded to plaintiffs’ counsel
increased in cases following Morrison (at least where fees had been awarded through the date of
this study). In particular, mean (median) fee awards increased from approximately $11 million
($2.8 million) in our pre-Morrison cases to $26 million ($4.4 million) in our post-Morrison
cases.
In Part III we identify the implications of our research for securities litigation generally as
well as Congress’ rushed response to Morrison.20 Our results are at first blush counter-intuitive.
Morrison was widely reported to foreclose an important class of Rule 10b-5 cases against foreign
issuers. However, our findings show that there is little evidence either that the “problem”
Morrison was meant to target existed or that Morrison effected a material change in the types of
issuers targeted or cases brought. Litigation appears to have continued at the same rates pre- and
post- Morrison with similar size settlements, dismissal rates and attorneys’ fees.
What then explains the Morrison decision and the surrounding hype? We believe the
most straight-forward explanation is that, despite contemporary characterizations of the case as
responding to a “burgeoning” area of Rule 10b-5 litigation against foreign issuers lacking any
meaningful U.S. presence, Morrison was effectively a preemptive ruling. Morrison responded to
a handful of cases and the potential expansion of Rule 10b-5 liability that they represented.
In the years preceding Morrison, there were a small number of global class actions
litigated in the U.S., in which plaintiffs’ counsel used the presence of U.S. transactions as a
jurisdictional hook to bring so-called global class actions that asserted claims on behalf of both
U.S. investors and foreign investors worldwide. The most prominent of these cases was
Vivendi.21 The class in Vivendi, a class that consisted primarily of foreign investors, was
successful in establishing liability, creating a potential $9 billion judgment against Vivendi.22
The rise of Vivendi-type cases raised the real specter, not just of massive liability exposure for
foreign firms in the U.S. courts but the grant to all investors worldwide of the right to pursue a
private claim for damages under the U.S. securities laws. It was this potential expansion to which
Morrison appears to have been addressed. Indeed, a major portion of the Vivendi verdict – over
19

Our settlement findings may appear hard to reconcile with the fact that, following the Morrison decision, a
number of courts relied on it to grant partial dismissals – reducing the class size by dismissing the claims brought by
foreign investors. The explanation for this result is that, even prior to the Morrison decision, the number of global
class actions filed was relatively small and some of those cases were dismissed based on the conduct and effects
tests that were then in use. As a result, global class actions were not common prior to Morrison.
20
Because Morrison was decided only weeks before Dodd-Frank became law, Congress responded by inserting a
provision into the statute at the last minute. Richard Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Provision: Was it Effective, Needed or Sufficient, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199 (2011). We discuss this infra at
notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
21
We discuss the two other significant outlier settlements Royal Dutch Ahold and Nortel infra at notes 46–51 and
accompanying text.
22
See Angelo G. Savino & Abby J. Sher, Vivendi – The Multi-Billion Dollar Impact Of Morrison On ForeignCubed Securities Litigation, MONDAQ, Mar. 30, 2011, available at
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/127648/Insurance/Vivendi+The+MultiBillion+Dollar+Impact+Of+Morrison
+On+ForeignCubed+Securities+Litigation+
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$7 billion -- was ultimately dismissed on Morrison grounds. The eventual plaintiff class, which
consisted only of investors who purchased Vivendi securities in the United States, settled their
claims for approximately $78 million.23
While Morrison makes it difficult to bring a 10b-5 action against a foreign issuer with no
U.S. exchange listing, our analysis suggests these cases were extraordinarily unlikely before
Morrison. The typical foreign firm defendant prior to Morrison was one that had a U.S.
exchange listing, and Morrison did not eliminate or even reduce litigation against these types of
foreign issuers. To the contrary, the transaction-based approach articulated by the Morrison
court continues to subject such issuers to potential liability, including liability for fraudulent
statements and activities conducted abroad. To the extent Morrison is described as a
“steamroller” of litigation against foreign issuers, it is simply a myth.
How then should we understand Morrison? We argue here that, rather than a decision
about the extraterritorial application of Rule 10b-5, Morrison can be better understood as
implementing a proportionality approach in which a foreign issuer’s liability exposure is
proportionate to the extent of its presence in the U.S. capital markets. We demonstrate that this
reasoning is consistent with the SEC’s regulatory approach to foreign private issuers, as well as
statutory limitations on the scope of the analogous liability provisions of the Securities Act of
1933.
Ultimately, our analysis and findings suggest that the rhetoric surrounding Morrison’s
analysis of extraterritoriality may be overstated. At its core, Morrison is not fundamentally
about which issuers are subject to the antifraud provision of the federal securities laws, but about
the universe of investors who have standing to advance an antifraud claim. To the extent that
commentators and subsequent courts have relied on Morrison as authority for foreclosing the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, that reliance is misplaced.
I.

Background
a. The Global Listings Market

The globalization of the securities markets has led to dramatic growth in cross-border
investing. U.S. investors increasingly purchase the securities of foreign issuers for a variety of
reasons such as obtaining greater diversification, investing in prominent multi-national
companies that are headquartered abroad, and investing in businesses and industries that are
located primarily outside the United States.24

23

Jonathan Stempel, Vivendi ends 15-year U.S. lawsuit over big merger, to pay $26.4 million, Reuters, Apr. 6, 2017,
available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vivendi-settlement-idUSKBN1782RQ.
24
For purposes of this Article, we consider foreign issuers to be issuers that are headquartered outside of the United
States. The ordinary shares of most foreign issuers, including the foreign issuers on which we will focus most of our
analysis, are traded on a primary exchange outside the United States such as the London Stock Exchange.
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U.S. investors can purchase the securities of foreign issuers in several ways.25 First, for
foreign firms without a U.S. exchange listing, investors can buy the shares directly on the foreign
exchange. Second, in some cases, a foreign issuer may have shares that are listed on a U.S.
exchange. The U.S. listing might represent an issuer’s exclusive exchange listing or a crosslisting in addition to an exchange listing in another jurisdiction.26 The U.S.-listed securities may
be ordinary shares,27 but more commonly are American Depository Receipts (ADRs).28 Finally,
in some cases, U.S. investors can purchase a foreign firm’s ordinary shares or ADRs that are not
listed on a U.S. exchange through the over-the-counter market.29
In reality, this trading is bifurcated depending upon the type of purchaser. For the most
part retail investors are foreclosed from purchasing shares on a foreign exchange due to
limitations on foreign trading in the United States through U.S. broker/dealers.30 Thus, retail
investors almost exclusively buy shares of foreign issuers in the United States on U.S. exchanges
and do not purchase shares of companies that are not listed or traded in the United States.31
Conversely, institutional and other sophisticated investors are able to purchase shares abroad,
25

See also Schwab Center for Financial Research, Cross-Listed International Stocks: Another Investing Alternative,
May 23, 2014, available at https://perma.cc/NTJ7-MEM6 (describing options for U.S. investors who want to invest
in international stocks).
26
The terms dual-listing, cross-listing and multiple listing are often used interchangeably. Technically, the term
cross-listing refers to circumstances in which a single issuer lists its shares on more than one exchange. In such
cases, the exchange on which most of the issuers’ securities are traded is known as the primary exchange, and any
other exchange is referred to as a secondary exchange.
27
Most cross-listed ordinary shares are securities of Canadian issuers. See https://perma.cc/NTJ7-MEM6 In a small
number of cases, foreign issuers create global registered shares. Global shares or GRSs are ordinary shares that can
be traded in multiple jurisdictions without the need for currency conversion. See, e.g., UBS Investor Relations,
Frequently asked questions UBS share, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/investor_relations/faq/share.html
(explaining GRSs). Daimler Chrysler and UBS are among the foreign issuers that have issued GRSs. See G.
Andrew Karolyi, DaimlerChrysler AG, The First Truly Global Share,
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=97411010609109610501611108808702109009007805704700206512
208402106810702501303107312509511203007301700805805205712200811209600707810300306601209912403
1070105029071110001115092030023067008067&EXT=pdf (describing DaimlerChrysler’s creation of the GRS
and exploring reasons why the GRS experienced poor share price performance and substantial flowback to the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange).
28
The terms ADR and ADS (American Depository Shares) are often used interchangeably. See SEC Office of
Investor Education and Advocacy, Investor Bulletin: American Depositary Receipts, available at
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/adr-bulletin.pdf. ADRs are created when a bank custodian holds foreign shares
for the benefit of U.S. investors. The ordinary shares, which are on deposit with the bank, are ADSs. The bank
issues certificates, priced in dollars, representing an interest in those ADSs, which may or may not have a one-to-one
correspondence with the ordinary shares. Those certificates are ADRs and may be listed on a U.S. exchange and
traded by U.S. investors. Technically an ADR investor does not own the underlying ordinary shares represented by
the ADR, and that shareholders’ rights are determined in part by the contractual terms of the ADR. ADRs can be
sponsored or unsponsored by the issuer, and some, but not all, issuers raise capital through cross-listings. See, e.g.,
Tom Zanki, Dual-Listed IPOs Carve A Small But Steady Niche, LAW 360, Aug. 4, 2016, available at
https://perma.cc/FNC5-P7W5 (discussing and citing recent examples of dual-listed IPOs).
29
The over-the-counter market is a general term used to refer to the trading in equity securities that are not listed on
an exchange. See generally Michael J. Simon & Robert L. D. Colby, The National Market System for Over-theCounter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17, 19 (1986).
30
See generally Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New
International Framework, 48 Harvard Int’l L.J. 31, 47-49 (2007) (describing the barriers to foreign securities
investment by retail investors located in the United States).
31
Id. at 48.
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something that these investors often prefer due to the lower trading costs and greater liquidity on
these foreign exchanges.32
b. Securities Fraud, Foreign Issuers and the Morrison Decision
Securities fraud by foreign issuers may involve fraudulent conduct that occurs in the
United States, overseas, or both, raising a question about the circumstances under which such
transnational cases fall within the scope of section 10(b). For many years, the ability of plaintiffs
to bring securities fraud class actions against foreign issuers was governed by two legal standards
set out by the Second Circuit.33 In Leasco and Bertch, the court held that a foreign issuer could
be subject to Section 10(b) if it engaged in sufficient fraudulent conduct in the United States.34
In Schoenbaum, the court held that Section 10(b) could be applied if the fraudulent transaction
had substantial effects in the United States.35 Courts described the so-called “conduct” and
“effects” tests as delineating the “extraterritorial reach of the antifraud provisions.”36 Although
the conduct and effects tests were widely followed by other federal courts, a number of
commentators criticized the resulting expansive scope of jurisdiction both as unprincipled37 and
for opening the U.S. courts to cases that had limited ties to the United States.38
The Supreme Court responded to these concerns by replacing the conduct and effects
tests in Morrison.39 The Morrison case was publicized in the press as a so-called “F-cubed”
case,40 in that it was brought by foreign shareholders who bought their shares on a foreign
32

See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Do Institutional Investors Value the 10b-5 Private Right of Action? Evidence from
Investor Trading Behavior Following Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 183, 196 (2015)
(finding in a sample of 420 cross-listed firms that “[o]verall, just 35% of the $656 billion of cross-listed trades
within the sample were executed on U.S. exchanges, as might be expected given the historically lower trading costs
and higher trading liquidity available in local trading markets.”)
33
See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L.
Rev. 523, 542-43 (1993) (describing the conduct and effects tests).
34
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
35
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
36
See Stephen J. Choi & Linda J. Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action Lawsuits,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 469 (2009).
37
See, e.g., Gregory K. Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over Transnational Securities
Fraud., 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 148 (1990) (terming the conduct and effects tests ‘startling in light of both the drafters'
express purpose of perfecting domestic securities markets and the Supreme Court's 'historical approach' to statutory
construction”)
38
See, e.g., Ashby Jones, The Whole World is Watching: ‘F-Cubed’ Case Moves to High Court, The Wall St. J.,
Mar. 29, 2010 (quoting claim that "[e]xposing foreign companies to class actions in the United States based merely
on the existence of an American subsidiary or listing on a U.S. exchange will discourage foreign investment here.”).
39
Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267 (2010).
40
Prior to Morrison, commentators identified three categories of cases against foreign issuers. The first category
was cases against foreign domiciled issuers involving U. S. investors who purchased on U.S. exchanges. F-squared
cases were those brought by American investors against foreign issuers involving securities traded on a foreign
exchange. F-cubed cases were cases brought by foreign investors against foreign issuers involving securities traded
on a foreign exchange. See Kevin LaCroix, O.K., F-Cubed Claims Are Out, But What About F-Squared Claims?,
The D&O Diary, Jul. 21, 2010, available at https://www.dandodiary.com/2010/07/articles/securities-litigation/o-k-fcubed-claims-are-out-but-what-about-f-squared-claims/ (explaining F-squared and F-cubed cases in the context of
the Morrison decision).
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exchange, against foreign issuers.41 Also known as global class actions, F-cubed lawsuits were a
particular concern because they sought to hold liable foreign issuers with little connection to the
United States and because they had the potential to increase the size and scope of U.S. litigation
against foreign issuers.42
The most dramatic example of the global class action was the Vivendi case, which was
pending at the time of the Morrison decision. The trial court in Vivendi certified a plaintiff class
that included “all persons from the United States, France, England, and the Netherlands who
purchased or otherwise acquired ordinary shares or American Depository Shares of Vivendi.”43
The case was tried before a jury which found for the plaintiffs, leading the Court to enter a
preliminary judgment which would have exceeded $9 billion.44 Prior to Vivendi, two other cases
against foreign issuers resulted in very high settlements – Royal Dutch Ahold and Nortel.45 In
Royal Dutch Ahold, the court certified a settlement class consisting of “All persons and entities
who purchased and/or received as a dividend Royal Ahold N.V. common shares and/or
American Depository Receipts from July 30, 1999 through February 23, 2003, regardless of
where they live or where they purchased their Ahold shares” 46 and approved a settlement of $1.1
billion.47 Nortel involved a plaintiff class included both U.S. and Canadian investors and settled
for over $2.9 billion.48
Yet even under the conduct and effects tests, it was far from clear whether a court could
properly exercise jurisdiction in global class actions. The court identified the potential
jurisdictional issue in Royal Ahold deciding that jurisdiction existed because the bulk of the fraud
occurred in the United States, a finding which was not reviewed by a federal appellate court
when the case was settled.49 Other courts addressed the question of jurisdiction more directly
and, in some cases, declined to exercise jurisdiction over transactions occurring abroad.50 As we
show in Section 2(c), courts routinely used the conduct and effects test to limit the class of
investors to those having a meaningful nexus to the United States.
41

See, e.g. Gary L. Gassman, Foreign Issuers, Foreign Exchanges: The Current State of Foreign-Cubed U.S.
Securities Litigation, 41 THE BRIEF 10, 11 (2012).
42
For a discussion of this issue see Buxbaum, supra note 59.
43
In re Vivendi Universal, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 76, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
44
See Savino & Sher, supra note 22 (“the effect of [Morrison] will be to reduce what was projected to be a $9.0
billion recovery by as much as 80 percent or more”).
45
See U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Securities Class Action Litigation, Jul. 2008, at 8, available at
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/SecuritiesBooklet.pdf (observing that Royal Ahold and
Nortel were “two of the top ten largest settlements of all time.”)
46
In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1928, *16 (D. Md. 2006).
47
Id. at *48.
48
See Nortel Networks Corporation (Nortel I & II) Securities Litigation, Stanford Law School Securities Class
Action Clearinghouse, available at http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-case.html?id=101707. The first complaint in
the Nortel case was filed on February 16, 2001 so is not in our dataset. Id. See generally In re Nortel Networks Corp.
Secs. Litig., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15702 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 5, 2003) (certifying class).
49
In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F.Supp. 334 (D. Md. 2006). See also Martha Graybow, Judge
Oks $2.4 billion settlement in Nortel Case, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 26, 2006.
50
See, e.g., Blechner v. Daimler-Benz Ag, 410 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Del. 2006) (declining to exercise jurisdiction
where the conduct did not occur primarily in the United States and the plaintiff class consisted of foreign investors)
In re European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. Sec. Litig., 703 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying
conduct and effects test to dismiss F-cubed lawsuit by European investors against European issuer for filings within
the European Union).
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Indeed in Morrison itself, the lower courts had dismissed the complaint as falling outside
the scope of the existing Second Circuit standard.51 In his concurrence Justice Stevens
recognized this point, writing that he would maintain the conduct and effects tests, and uphold
the Second Circuit’s ruling on the grounds that “this case has Australia written all over it.”52 In
this vein, it was hardly obvious that Morrison would become the test case for whether F-cubed
cases could proceed under Section 10b-5.
In addition, the characterization of Morrison as an F-cubed lawsuit is questionable.
National Australia Bank, the defendant in the case, had ADRs listed on the New York Stock
Exchange for the duration of the class period, as well as at the time the underlying complaint was
brought, and the original class of plaintiffs included investors who acquired U.S. ADRs. The trial
court, however, dismissed this class of plaintiffs for failing to allege any quantifiable damages.
Thus, by the time the case was heard by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff class consisted entirely
of investors in National Australia Bank’s ordinary shares purchased abroad and who lacked any
obvious connection to the U.S. In addition, NAB delisted its ADRs shortly after the suit was
filed. It was for these reasons that counsel for National Australia Bank and multiple amica were
able to use Morrison not just to challenge the lower court’s interpretation of the conduct and
effects tests—the approach advanced by plaintiffs in their petition for certiorari—but also as a
vehicle to attack the use of Rule 10b-5 in F-cubed cases. 53
Morrison reflected a concerted effort by William Conway, III, a partner at the law firm of
Wachtell, Lipton Rosen & Katz, to push the Supreme Court to replace the Second Circuit test.54
This effort was supported by an array of business-friendly interests. Critics of the application of
Section 10(b) to F-cubed claims in particular argued that burdensome U.S. securities fraud

51

Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253.
Id. at 286.
53
Notably, because of the dismissal of the ADR holders, Morrison was debated at the Supreme Court largely in the
context of whether Section 10(b) extended to claims by investors who purchased securities abroad. See, e.g.,
Amicus Brief for Alecta Pensionforskring, et al., available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
PetitionerAmCuAlectaetal.authcheckdam.pdf (defending application of 10(b) to claims by foreign investors who
traded abroad); Amicus Brief for the Australian Shareholders’ Assn, available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
PetitionerAmCuASAandACSI.authcheckdam.pdf (arguing that the Court should not allow the U.S. to be used as a
base for fraudulent conduct affecting the interests of foreign investors).
54
Mr. Conway argued the case for NAB and in the wake of Morrison argued for its extended application in other
securities law areas. See Ross Todd, Architect of Morrison v. NAB Takes on Feds in Amicus Brief for NYC Bar, THE
AMLAW LITIGATION DAILY, Sept. 12, 2012, available at
https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/almID/1202572772363/ (detailing Mr. Conway’s efforts to argue that
Morrison’s holding also applied in the case of criminal securities fraud claims). To be sure, there was academic
criticism of the Second Circuit test beforehand. Choi & Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities
Class–Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467–468; Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities
Laws: The Need for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject–Matter Jurisdiction, 9 Fordham J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 106–108, 115–116 (2004); Donald Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of
Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 244–248
(1992).
52
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litigation deterred foreign issuers from issuing securities to U.S. residents.55 They also claimed
that the Second Circuit test violated other nations’ sovereignty56 and conflicted with the laws of
other jurisdictions.57 Mixed in these arguments were notions of judicial economy, that the U.S.
courts should not be burdened with suits based upon the foreign purchase of securities.58
These arguments worked. In Morrison, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the conduct and
effects tests as improperly giving Section 10(b) extraterritorial application and set forth a bright
line test limiting private securities litigation to domestic transactions. Justice Scalia writing for
the majority held that a cause of action could be brought only if “the purchase or sale of a
security listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in
the United States.”59 The test thus purported to eliminate shareholder private causes of actions
under Rule 10b-5 brought with respect to any foreign purchases.
c. The Morrison Case and Public Reaction
The Morrison decision was a controversial one. First, it overruled longstanding Second
Circuit precedent. Second, the repudiation of this Second Circuit test was vigorously opposed by
many institutional investors and shareholder advocates.60 Among the reasons for this opposition
was that the ruling eliminated not only “F-cubed” cases but also “F-squared” cases—that is,
cases brought by U.S. domiciled investors who bought their shares in the foreign companies on
foreign exchanges. 61 As a result, Morrison deprived U.S. investors of the antifraud remedy in
55

See Amicus Brief of NYSE Euronext at 3, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/Morrison.NYSE-Euronext-in-Support-of-Resp.pdf, (“Issuers worldwide have repeatedly
expressed concern to NYSE Euronext that the risk of U.S. litigation has deterred them from raising capital in the
U.S.”).
56
See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
RespondentAmCuUnitedKingdom.authcheckdam.pdf, at 2 (arguing that “the broad assertion of extraterritorial
jurisdiction by United States courts implicates the legitimate sovereign interests and policy choices of the United
Kingdom.”).
57
See Amicus Brief of the Republic of France, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/02/Morrison.Republic-of-France-in-Support-of-REsp.pdf, at 4 (explaining that “certain
aspects of the U.S. approach conflict with specific legal rules of foreign nations.”).
58
See Amicus Brief for Law Professors, available at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1191_
RespondentAmCuLawProfs.authcheckdam.pdf , at 28 (arguing that “allowing traders in foreign markets to sue
under section 10(b) will burden United States courts and make the United States a venue for global securities
litigation”)
59
Morrison, 561 U.S at 273. Hannah Buxbaum had previously advocated the approach adopted by Morrison Court.
See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional
Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 68 (2007) (“the best alternative may be to adopt a rule that simply limits
subject-matter jurisdiction under the anti-fraud provisions to claims arising out of transactions on U.S. markets”).
60
See, e.g., Christian J. Ward, et al., Council for Institutional Investors, Morrison v. National Australia Bank
The Impact on Institutional Investors (Feb. 2012), 7 ((“the limitation on [Morrison’s] reach seriously affects
investors’ remedies for fraud.”) available at
https://www.cii.org/files/publications/white_papers/02_02_12_morrison_v_national_australia_bank.pdf.
61
See, e.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame - International Securities Litigation after Morrison:
Correcting the Supreme Court's Transactional Test, 52, VA. J. INT. L. 405, 408 (2012) (observing that “Morrison
can deprive American investors who buy securities from an American issuer of the protections of the securities laws
merely because the transaction occurs abroad.”)
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circumstances in which they purchased their securities abroad. Shareholder advocates argued
U.S. institutional investors commonly acquire securities in foreign markets, either because these
are the only markets where they can seek international diversification or because these markets
are generally more liquid than the U.S. ADR market (where foreign firms often cross-list their
shares).62 Accordingly, these investors claimed that Morrison deprived them of their ability to
use Rule 10b-5 to combat fraud.63 For similar reasons, these investors claimed the decision
could incentivize foreign issuers to adjust their conduct to ensure that security issuances occurred
abroad in order to deprive U.S. holders of the protections of Section 10b and Rule 10b-5.64
In the months following the decision, there was almost uniform agreement that Morrison
marked a sea-change in securities litigation with one author writing that the “world of securities
fraud litigation was irrevocably altered . . . .”65 In Morrison’s wake, memos and other writings
appeared to hail the decision as an end to foreign securities litigation. Morrison was also
described as “dramatically” changing the litigation landscape for foreign issuers.66 Most notably,
the Morrison decision resulted in the dismissal of investors who purchased their securities
abroad from the Vivendi case, which was pending at the time of Morrison and which had the
potential to result in the largest-ever private securities fraud judgment.67 Marc I. Steinberg and
Kelly Flanagan wrote to say that Morrison “drastically altered the landscape for transnational
62

Ward et al., supra note 60, at 10.
Id. at 11 (“Morrison’s transactional test, however, creates new incentives for issuers to withdraw from American
stock markets.”).
64
Morrison did not involve an SEC enforcement action. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("The Court's opinion does not, however, foreclose the [SEC] from bringing enforcement actions in
additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the [SEC's] authority is presented by this case."). Nonetheless, a
variety of commentators argued that the Court’s analysis implicated the scope of the SEC’s regulatory authority.
See, e.g., Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, Applicability to SEC of Private Action Requirements in § 10(b)
Cases, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 11, 2010, at 3 ("In light of the Court's rationale and its holding . . . it is difficult to see how the
SEC would not [be] subject to the Morrison analysis."). Congress responded to this concern in the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Consumer Protection Act of 2010. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; see also Nidhi M.
Geevarghese, A Shocking Loss of Investor Protection: The Implications of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 6
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 235, 249-50 (2011) (exploring congressional response).
65
See Vladislava Soshkina, Beyond Morrison: The Effect of the “Presumption Against Extraterritoriality” and the
Transactional Test on Foreign Tender Offers, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 281 (2012).
66
See Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. – The U.S. Supreme Court Confirms that
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act Does Not Apply Extraterritorially & Dismisses the Claims of “FCubed” Plaintiffs, Jul. 6, 2010 (“The Supreme Court’s June 24, 2010, opinion in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. __ (2010), has narrowed dramatically the scope of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder”), available at
https://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/3225362_1.pdf; Davis Polk Client Newsflash,
Update: U.S. Supreme Court Limits Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws— Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, Jun. 28, 2010, available at https://www.davispolk.com/files/files/Publication/b8410ed8-13e1-40b08f12-033b6ea69c83/Preview/PublicationAttachment/450c2bc3-1d4e-4440-9cd5a3eff5e1dd2e/062510_morrison_v_nab.html (“The Court's decision should be a positive development for non-U.S.
issuers because it precludes plaintiffs from bringing federal securities fraud claims with respect to the purchase or
sale of their securities on foreign exchanges or otherwise outside the United States”). See also David He, Beyond
Securities Fraud: The Territorial Reach of the U.S. Laws After Morrison v. N.A.B., 2013 COLUMBIA BUS. L. REV.
148, 169 (“The majority in Morrison undertook an analysis that went far beyond the circumstances of the case and
severely limited the ability of plaintiffs to seek recourse through private securities fraud litigation”)
67
See Court Finds Vivendi Liable for Misleading Investors, THE N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010 at B3. (reporting that
the potential judgment in Vivendi of $9.3 billion was potentially “the largest securities class-action jury verdict in
history”).
63
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securities litigation and the way that courts determine proper application of a statute concerning a
transnational claim.”68
Morrison’s broad language about extraterritoriality also had broad effects, effects that
extend well beyond private securities fraud litigation. The Morrison decision has influenced the
interpretation of statutes in a wide range of contexts,69 from the alien tort statute70 to the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).71 In each of these cases the courts
applied the Morrison holding to consider whether a federal statute should have extraterritorial
application. The results have been to limit the scope of U.S. jurisdiction. Indeed, in one
particularly controversial decision, the Second Circuit applied the Morrison decision to hold that
a criminal conviction for securities fraud under Section 10b can only be sustained if the person
“engaged in fraud in connection with (1) a security listed on a U.S. exchange, or (2) a security
purchased or sold in the United States.”72
The controversial nature of the Morrison decision was quickly highlighted when only a
few months later Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act sought to restore the SEC’s authority to bring
suit to enforce Section 10b and Rule 10b-5 subject only to constitutional limitations on the
exercise of jurisdiction.73 Although it was not clear that the provision in Dodd-Frank was either
necessary or that it was drafted appropriately to resolve any ambiguity about regulators’
enforcement authority,74 Congress appears to have taken the view that Morrison threatened such
authority.75
In Dodd-Frank, Congress also ordered the SEC to conduct a study to determine the extent
to which private rights of action should be extended to the same conduct for which Section 929P
authorized government enforcement actions.76 The SEC performed this study, and the results

68

Marc I. Steinberg & Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings – Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46 MORRISON
829, 829 (Fall 2012).
69
See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (relying on Morrison to reach a restrictive view of California’s
power to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign company).
70
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
71
Gideon Mark, RICO's Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 543 (2013).
72
United States v. Vilar, 2013 WL 4608948 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2013).
73
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P, 124 Stat. 1376,
1871 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd -Frank Act]. As one commentator has noted, the Dodd-Frank provision was “hastily
drafted” because “Morrison was decided only weeks before the Act became law.” Painter, supra note 20, at 199.
Immediately after passage of the bill, Mr. Conway issued a client note from his law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz arguing that the provision did not overturn Morrison due to a drafting error amounting to a “fatal omission”.
See George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality of the Federal Securities Laws After Dodd-Frank: Partly
Because of a Drafting Error, the Status Quo Should Remain Unchanged, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
(June 21, 2010) available at
http://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.17763.10.pdf
74
See Painter, supra note 20, at 229. (concluding that “Congress passed a poorly drafted provision that may not do
anything other than confer jurisdiction that courts already have, although Congress probably intended for it to do
more”)
75
See, e.g., SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1292 (D. Utah 2017) (recounting legislation
history of Section 929(P)(b) of Dodd-Frank).
76
See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 73, at 929P.
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seemed to confirm the continued dispute over the scope and desirability of the Morrison rule.77
In that study the SEC received 72 comment letters, 44 of which supported the old Second Circuit
test or a modified version thereof, and 23 which supported the Morrison test.78 The study did not
reach a conclusion as to whether private litigation should be expanded, explaining: “the
conflicting evidence in the academic literature and the results of our event study on the Morrison
decision are inconclusive as to the net benefits or costs of a cross-border extension of private
rights of action.”79
D.

Morrison and Academic Study

Academic commentary regarding the effects of Morrison has similarly been mixed.
Several studies have examined the impact of Morrison on asset prices and investor trading
behavior. Positing that Morrison’s wholesale rejection of the conduct and effects test was
largely unexpected, Professors Gagnon and Karolyi examine stock price reactions surrounding
the publication of the Morrison decision to gauge investors’ reactions to the new rule.80
Focusing on nearly 1,000 foreign firms that were listed on both a U.S. exchange and a domestic
venue, they find that publication of the decision was associated with a positive return of 44 basis
points for firms’ U.S.-listed securities relative to their locally-traded securities.81 They interpret
these results as evidence that market participants revalued the newly differentiated application of
the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 to investors in a firm’s ADRs relative to its home-market
shares.82
Using a similar research design, Professors Licht, Poliquin, Siegel & Li (LPSL) likewise
examine stock price reactions to cross-listed firms but focus on stock price movements
surrounding the time of the oral arguments for Morrison when they posit the Court signaled its
willingness to discard the conduct and effects test.83 Overall, LPSL fail to find any negative
market reaction to this event in either the U.S. or local markets. On the contrary, they find that
U.S.-listed foreign firms experienced insignificant or even positive abnormal returns in both
markets, particularly among firms having most of their equity traded outside the U.S. The
authors conclude that these findings are consistent with the idea that a “U.S.-style securitiesfraud class action regime could be viewed as a regulatory burden for firms. ”84 These results are
also consistent with the findings of Professor Robert Bartlett who, using a proprietary dataset of
378 institutional investor trades, examines institutional investor trading during the thirty-month
period surrounding Morrison. Despite the fact that Morrison made clear that trades in U.S.exchange listed securities now come with the right to pursue a private Rule 10b-5 action,
77

See Securities and Exchange Commission Staff, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (April 2012).
78
Id. at 38.
79
Id. at B13.
80
See Louis Gagnon and George Andrew Karolyi, An Unexpected Test of the Bonding Hypothesis (October 20,
2017). Johnson School Research Paper Series No. 50-2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961178
or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961178
81
Id. at 3.
82
Id. at 5-8.
83
Amir N. Licht, Christopher Poliquin, Jordan I. Siege & Li Xi, What makes the bonding stick? A natural
experiment involving the U.S. Supreme Court and cross-listed firm, 129(2) J. FIN. ECON. 329 (2018).
84
Id. at 330.
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Professor Bartlett finds investors in his sample did not reallocate trades to the U.S.-listed
securities of cross-listed foreign firms following the decision.85
Professor Yuliya Guseva takes a different approach in assessing the practical effect of
Morrison on 10b-5 litigation. Professor Guseva analyzes 222 10b-5 cases brought against foreign
private issuers in the five years before and five years after Morrison was decided.86 While
Professor Guseva finds that F-cubed cases were “rare” prior to the Morrison case,87 she also
finds that settlement amounts within her sample declined in the wake of Morrison and that
dismissals rose. Because damages arising from share acquisitions on non-U.S. venues are no
longer recoverable after Morrison, these latter findings are consistent with Morrison placing
plaintiffs in a weaker negotiating position, perhaps because pre-Morrison cases commonly
included a worldwide class of shareholders who acquired most of their shares on non-U.S.
venues. Professor Guseva also finds that the liability exposure of foreign issuers became more
“ascertainable” post-Morrison, as it was capped by the extent to which they have accessed the
U.S. capital markets. 88 To the extent this was the case, the limitation of Rule 10b-5 protection to
shares acquired on a U.S.-exchange would constitute a clear reduction in the way in which Rule
10b-5 was used prior to Morrison, consistent with the conventional wisdom.
However, Guseva’s dataset lacks information concerning the relative levels of U.S. and
foreign trading volume among cross-listed firms, making it impossible to discern whether preMorrison cases commonly consisted of foreign firms with de minimis U.S. exchange trading.
Guseva’s dataset also includes defendants headquartered in China.89 Yet, the litigation involving
Chinese firms is distinctive. Most notably, the post-Morrison era coincided with a wave of Rule
10b-5 claims against small U.S.-exchange traded Chinese firms that often obtained their
exchange-listing through a reverse merger with a non-operating shell corporation utilizing
allegedly misleading disclosures. The presence of these small, reverse-merger cases potentially
confounds Guseva’s settlement analysis and highlights the challenge of simply comparing the
pre- and post-Morrison litigation environments. Professor Guseva also does not distinguish
between firms that are listed exclusively on a U.S. exchange and firms with cross-listed
securities. As we explain below, the Morrison decision should have had no impact on the latter
set of firms.
The gaps in Professor Guseva’s analysis and the conflicting findings of the finance
studies suggest that it would be beneficial to examine Rule 10b-5 litigation filed against foreign
issuers in the years surrounding Morrison to understand more precisely how the case
transformed transnational securities litigation. Significantly, the foregoing research designs do
not distinguish between the effect of Morrison in eliminating an existing practice of bringing
Rule 10b-5 suits that focused on the acquisition of a foreign issuer’s non-US securities (such as
85

Bartlett, supra note 32, at 186-187.
Yuliya Guseva, Extraterritoriality of Securities Law Redux: Litigation Five Years after Morrison v. National
Australia Bank, 2017 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 199.
87
Id. at 261.
88
Id. at 279. Professor Guseva analyzed a sample of 75 cases from an earlier time period in another paper and
concluded that foreign private issuers were subject to considerable uncertainty as to the extent of their potential
liability exposure. See Yuliya Guseva, Cross-Listings and the New World of International Capital: Another Look at
the Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities Law, 44 GEO. J. INT. L. 411 (2013).
89
See Yuseva, supra note 86, at 256.
86
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in an F-cubed or F-squared lawsuit) from the possibility that Morrison eliminated the prospect
that global class actions would become widespread in the future.90
II.

Data and Empirical Analysis

To assess the effect of Morrison on Rule 10b-5 litigation practices, we follow Professor
Guseva in examining Rule 10b-5 cases in the years surrounding Morrison, though our
methodology differs in several respects. First, we focus primarily on foreign issuers that were
subject to U.S. litigation pre- and post-Morrison, in order to interrogate the extent to which
Morrison reduced the litigation burden on this set of issuers. Second, in examining case
outcomes surrounding Morrison, we expressly account for the large number of Rule 10b-5 cases
brought during the post-Morrison time period against small Chinese firms whose shares were
listed exclusively on U.S. venues. Third, and most importantly, we distinguish between foreign
firms whose securities are listed exclusively on a U.S. exchange and those that met our definition
of a Foreign Listed Firm.
a. Data
Our sample of Rule 10b-5 cases comes from the Stanford Securities Litigation
Clearinghouse, which tracks all securities class action lawsuits filed in federal court since
January 1, 1996. We collect all cases filed between January 2002 and December 2017, dropping
all cases that do not involve securities fraud, and more specifically, do not plead Section 10(b)
allegations. We further filter cases to identify those cases that were filed against a corporate
issuer having its headquarters located outside of the United States. Our final sample consists of
388 suits filed between 2002 and 2017.
We hand-collect information from the Clearinghouse and court dockets on a variety of
metrics surrounding each case. In particular, we obtain information from Bloomberg and CRSP
regarding whether a defendant firm’s shares were traded on any U.S. or non-U.S. exchanges and
the dollar volume of trading on each trading venue during the class period specified in the
complaint. We obtain data regarding the characteristics of the defendant firm and the lawsuit
directly from court filings and Edgar.
In Table 1, we summarize the distribution of our sample cases by year of filing.

Year
2002

Table 1: Sample Cases by Year of Filing
All Cases in Sample
All Cases in Sample
with Non-US Listing
N
%
N Listing)%
19
4.90%
12
6.56%

All Cases in Stanford
Litigation Clearinghouse
N
%
265
7.94%

90

Likewise, while LPSL suggest that foreign firms having little U.S. trading volume experienced positive abnormal
returns due to their reduced risk of Rule 10b-5 exposure following Morrison, their research design cannot speak to
whether the market reaction was due to existing Rule 10b-5 practices. For instance, was their finding due to the fact
that these firms were subject to large levels of Rule 10b-5 exposure before Morrison but would no longer bear such
risks because of the lower settlement value these cases offered to plaintiffs and their counsel? Or was it the case that
these firms were never the subject of meaningful levels of 10b-5 litigation, suggesting that the market’s reaction was
primarily driven by the reduced possibility that these firms would be subject to 10b-5 litigation in the future?
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2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Total:
Total Pre-Morrison:
Total Post-Morrison:

13
25
17
10
19
21
9
17
50
24
25
25
31
37
46
388
141
246

3.35%
6.44%
4.38%
2.58%
4.90%
5.41%
2.32%
4.38%
12.89%
6.19%
6.44%
6.44%
7.99%
9.54%
11.86%
100%
36.34%
63.66%

9
15
10
2
11
18
7
3
11
11
14
8
8
21
23
183
87
93

4.92%
8.20%
5.46%
1.09%
6.01%
9.84%
3.83%
1.64%
6.01%
6.01%
7.65%
4.37%
4.37%
11.48%
12.57%
100%
47.54%
52.46%

228
239
182
121
177
223
165
175
188
151
165
168
208
271
412
3,338
1,663
1,675

6.83%
7.16%
5.45%
3.62%
5.30%
6.68%
4.94%
5.24%
5.63%
4.52%
4.94%
5.03%
6.23%
8.12%
12.34%
100%
53.18%
46.82%

The first column presents the number of cases in our sample, regardless of whether the
defendant had a trading venue outside of the U.S. Importantly, even if a firm is headquartered
outside of the U.S., it is possible for the issuer to trade principally or even exclusively on a U.S.
trading venue or exchange. This practice is commonly observed among technology firms based
in China and Israel that often incorporate in the United States and arrange to have their ordinary
shares trade exclusively on a U.S. stock exchange. Data in the first column thus commingles
foreign-based firms whose equity can be acquired on non-U.S. venues with foreign-based firms
whose equity can only be acquired on a U.S. exchange or in the U.S. OTC market.91
Firms whose equity can only be acquired on a U.S. exchange should not have been
affected by the Morrison decision because investors in these firms necessarily satisfy the
Morrison test by acquiring their shares on a U.S. exchange.92 We confirm this conclusion in
Section II(c) when we examine case outcomes. Columns 3 and 4 therefore summarize all
lawsuits for the subset of foreign defendant firms whose equity traded on at least one non-U.S.
venue. These firms, which we refer to as “Foreign Listed Firms,” were most directly affected by
the Morrison rule insofar that investors in these firms could have acquired their securities on a
non-U.S. exchange and would therefore fail the first prong of Morrison’s transaction test.
Accordingly, we focus much of our analysis on this group of companies.
Finally, in Columns 5 and 6 we examine overall litigation rates in order to explore if the
general litigation environment changed both pre- and post- Morrison. We find that the litigation
rates for all securities litigation as recorded by the Stanford Litigation Clearinghouse are roughly
similar to those related to foreign firms. 53.18% of all securities cases were brought preMorrison while 46.82% were brought post-Morrison. In unreported tests we compare the
91

Among the 205 foreign firms in our sample that did not have a local trading market, only three traded exclusively
in the U.S. over-the-counter market.
92
Where a foreign firm’s securities trade exclusive in the U.S. OTC market, we surmise that investors in these firms
would most likely satisfy the second prong of Morrison. Consistent with this conclusion, all three of these cases
noted in n. 91 were commenced following Morrison’s publication; however, Morrison was raised in only one of
these cases in an effort by the defendant issuer to dismiss investors who acquired their shares in an offshore,
Regulation S offering of the company’s securities
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percentage of foreign securities litigation to all litigation and find no statistical change in
percentages or comparative rates of litigation over the sample time period.
Finally, in Figure 1 we examine the proportion of lawsuits within our full sample that
named as a defendant a firm headquartered in China. As noted previously, a large number of
10b-5 cases were brought against Chinese based firms following Morrison, stemming in part
from a wave of reverse mergers involving these companies in the years surrounding the decision.
As highlighted in Figure 1, cases involving Chinese firms were especially prominent in 2010 and
2011, representing over 60% of all private 10b-5 cases brought against non-U.S. firms in those
years.93 Notably, as we show below, these firms had market capitalizations that were generally
smaller than other firms within our sample, suggesting that recoverable 10b-5 damages would
also be lower than in 10b-5 cases against larger firms. At the same time, nearly all of these
defendant firms’ securities traded exclusively on a U.S. stock exchange and, consequently, their
exposure to a 10b-5 lawsuit was unlikely to have been reduced by Morrison. These cases thus
represent a potentially confounding factor in prior studies of Morrison that do not expressly
grapple with the fact that foreign firms that trade exclusively on U.S. exchanges were largely
unaffected by the decision. We return to this topic again in Section II(c).

0

Number of Lawsuits by Year of Complaint
10
20
30
40

50

Figure 1:
Proportion of Chinese Headquartered Firms Within Sample of 10b-5 Actions Against Non-US Firms

2000

2005

2010
Year of Complaint

All Foreign 10b-5 Defendants

2015

2020

10b-5 Defendants Headquartered in China

b. Morrison and the Risk of a 10b-5 Lawsuit for Foreign Issuers
We first examine the extent to which Morrison changed the risk of facing a Rule 10b-5
class action lawsuit for non-U.S. issuers. As a general matter, Morrison should have reduced the
viability of a Rule 10b-5 lawsuit by U.S. and foreign investors who acquired their securities
93

Of these cases, we classify fifty-two as involving reverse mergers.
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outside the United States (i.e., so called “F-squared” and “F-cubed” cases) given, as discussed
previously, the Morrison ruling was designed to exclude these investors from the protections of
Rule 10b-5. Nonetheless, Morrison did not prevent foreign issuers from being sued in
connection with transactions that occurred in the United States. Accordingly, the question after
Morrison was the extent to which foreign purchasers were a meaningful part of Rule 10b-5
litigation prior to Morrison or whether Morrison was responsive to a possible, but as-yet
unrealized, risk.
At the same time, Morrison purports to be about the likelihood that a foreign issuer
would be subject to suit in the United States for federal securities fraud. The data in Columns 3
and 4 of Table 1 reveal no clear decline in the total number of suits against Foreign Listed Firms.
However, we lack information on whether the baseline level of fraudulent conduct remained
constant over our sample period. Therefore, these overall data leave open the possibility that Fsquared and F-cubed cases were common before Morrison and that simply more cases would
have been brought after 2010 had Morrison not been decided.
We hypothesize that Morrison should not have affected litigation against foreign issuers
whose securities traded exclusively on a U.S. exchange and that its impact should be limited to
Foreign Listed Firms.94 We therefore begin our analysis by examining the exchange listings of
the 183 Foreign Listed Firms in our sample. Among these firms, we classify a firm as “CrossListed” if shares of its common stock or its ADRs were also listed for trading on either the New
York Stock Exchange, Nasdaq or NYSE MKT (formally the American Stock Exchange) at any
time during the class period alleged in the class action complaint. Among the 183 Foreign Listed
Firms, 87 were sued in in our pre-Morrison sample period, of which 77 (88.5%) met this
definition of Cross-Listed. These numbers compare to 84 of the 96 (87.5%) of Foreign Listed
Firms sued in our post-Morrison sample, which was statistically indistinguishable from the preMorrison sample (χ (1) = 0.044, ns). The remainder of firms did not have securities listed on a
U.S. exchange and, to the extent they were held by U.S. investors, they were presumably either
purchased abroad, in private transactions or in the over-the-counter market
2

95

94

Because Morrison would not have affected foreign issuers with their sole listing in the United States, we exclude
these issuers as discussed supra.
95
Consistent with our central thesis, Morrison appears to have had relatively little effect even on these cases, despite
the total absence of a U.S. exchange listing for the companies’ securities. In particular, the case was cited as the
basis for dismissal in only two cases, both of which were filed prior to the decision. One was an “F-squared” case
brought against Swiss Re in 2008 and included in the class all U.S. residents who had acquired any securities of
Swiss Re during the class period. The district court dismissed the case in October 2010, citing Morrison and noting
that “a security that is sold on a foreign exchange is insufficient to subject the purchase to the coverage of
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.” The second case was filed against Société Générale in 2008 and the plaintiff
class included all holders of Société Générale’s securities that were purchased during the class period, including
purchasers of its ADRs that traded solely in US in the OTC market. In dismissing the case (including all claims by
holders of its ADRs), the district court found that, because "[t]rade in ADRs is considered to be a 'predominantly
foreign securities transaction,''' 10b-5 was inapplicable after Morrison. While the case has commonly been cited as
an example of Morrison’s reach, the court’s conclusion that transactions in ADRs of foreign firms that traded in the
OTC market were “foreign transactions” was based on a prior decision decided under the conducts and effects test
that had dismissed a similar set of claims against Fortis, holding that OTC transactions in ADRs are “predominantly
foreign securities transaction[s].” Copeland v. Fortis, 685 F. Supp.2d 498 (SDNY 2010). As this case suggests, even
under the conduct and effects test, cases against foreign issuers without a U.S. exchange listing tended to fare
poorly. For instance, among the ten cases filed before Morrison, eight were dismissed (including the two noted
previously), while just two settled. Of the twelve cases filed after Morrison, five remained pending at the time of
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We also examine for all Cross-Listed defendants the time period for which the firm had
its securities listed on a U.S. exchange. Issuers whose securities are listed for trading on a U.S.
exchange can have their shares delisted for any number of reasons, including an involuntary
delisting for failure to meet an exchange listing condition or simply because a firm chooses to
discontinue an exchange listing. However, under Morrison, investors who acquire shares of a
firm following its delisting are likely to be excluded from any Rule 10b-5 class action. Despite
the fact that the vast majority of pre-Morrison Foreign Listed Firms had a U.S. exchange listing
at some point during the class period, the possibility therefore exists that the securities of some
of these defendants were not traded on a U.S. exchange for the duration of the alleged class
period.
We formally examine this issue in Figure 2 where we present for each of the Cross-Listed
defendants (N=161), the percent of the class period during which the issuer had a U.S. exchange
listing. To facilitate analysis of how these percentages relate to the date of Morrison, we impose
a dashed-vertical line at June 24, 2010, the date the case was decided. As expected, conditional
on a defendant having a U.S. exchange listing, cases after Morrison reflected the new standard
and generally alleged a class period that fully coincided with the period during which the
defendant had such a listing. Yet even before Morrison, Rule 10b-5 lawsuits almost always
alleged a class period that coincided with the period during which the defendant had its securities
listed on a U.S. exchange. Indeed, in only two cases was this percentage substantially less than
100%--roughly equivalent to the post-Morrison period where three cases had percentages that
were meaningfully less than 100%.

our research, while four had been dismissed. Notably, three of these post-Morrison cases had settled despite the
absence of any U.S. exchange listing, including two involving the ADRs of Tesco PLC and Olympus Corporation,
both of which traded in the U.S. OTC market.
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Figure 2:
Percent of the Class Period Covering a US Exchange Listing
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These findings significantly undermine claims that Morrison was used “to extinguish” Fcubed and F-squared “claims that had proliferated in the years preceding Morrison…”96 Among
the 183 defendants in our sample that were Foreign Listed Firms, nearly 90% of the cases both
before and after Morrison were filed against firms that maintained a U.S. exchange listing.
Whether or not Morrison technically foreclosed investors “from accessing American courts to
litigate claims against foreign issuers whose shares do not trade on a U.S. exchange,”97 our data
does not indicate that investors were doing so prior to the Morrison decision. Moreover, among
these 161 Cross-Listed firms, almost all of the complaints alleged that the stock price was
allegedly affected by fraudulent conduct during the time period when the firm maintained a U.S.
exchange listing. As a result, even where a pre-Morrison complaint included in the class those
investors who acquired their securities in a non-U.S. venue, a plaintiff class could still be named
that would have complied with Morrison had the decision applied to these cases.
We also examine the dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading during the alleged class
period among the 161 Cross-Listed defendants. There are two reasons to analyze this. First,
prior to Morrison, critics asserted that foreign issuers were subject to suit despite having a
limited presence in the U.S. capital markets. Therefore, it is useful to determine whether
Morrison had the effect of limiting U.S. litigation to foreign issuers that had a larger capital
markets footprint in terms of dollar volume or the relative percentage of their securities that were
traded in the U.S. markets as opposed to abroad.
96

Conway, supra note 11, at 4.
David H. Kistenbroker, Joni S. Jacobsen, & Angela M. Liu, Dechert, Developments in Global Securities
Litigation, 4 (2017),
https://www.dechert.com/content/dam/dechert%20files/onpoint/2017/11/White_paper_Global_Securities_Litigation
_FINAL_0218.pdf.
97
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Second, despite the presence of a U.S. exchange listing, a foreign issuer will face a
diminished risk of a Rule 10b-5 private suit if the vast majority of its trading volume occurs on
non-U.S. venues where securities purchases will not satisfy Morrison. Thus, Morrison could
have raised the threshold amount of U.S. trading volume before plaintiffs or their counsel would
have found it valuable to bring a case. Assessing the level of U.S. exchange trading among preMorrison defendants thus provides a means to assess the extent to which the Morrison rule
would have altered the risk of a 10b-5 suit for these firms, notwithstanding the fact that a preMorrison defendant met the definition of a Cross-Listed firm.
In Table 2 we present summary statistics of the level of U.S. exchange trading among the
161 Cross-Listed defendants. For each year in which a complaint was filed, the table lists the
number of complaints filed during the year, the mean percentage of global trading (by dollar
volume) that occurred on U.S. exchanges during the class period, and the mean dollar volume of
U.S. exchange trading that occurred in defendant’s securities during the class period. All dollar
figures have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices.
As shown in the table, U.S. exchange trading constituted a nontrivial fraction of trading
in these firms’ securities both before and after Morrison. Among the 77 pre-Morrison cases, the
mean percentage of global trading occurring on U.S. Exchanges during the class period was
38.5%, while the mean dollar volume of trading was nearly $17.5 billion. These figures suggest
that, even had Morrison applied to these pre-Morrison cases, damage awards for U.S. exchange
trades could have been substantial in magnitude. However, consistent with claims that Morrison
might have shifted plaintiffs’ counsel to focus on firms having greater levels of U.S. exchange
trading, the overall post-Morrison mean percentage of U.S. exchange trading and the dollar
volume of U.S. exchange trading were higher than in the pre-Morrison period. At the same time,
visual inspection of the data reveals significant positive skew in U.S. trading volume during both
periods, which cautions against relying on these overall means to make inferences regarding the
relative level of U.S. exchange trading before and after the decision’s publication.

Year of Filing
Pre-Morrison
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
201098
Post-Morrison
2011
2012
2013
2014
98

Table 2: U.S. Exchange Trading During Class Period
Median % of Global Trading (by
Median Dollar Volume of
Number of
dollar volume) Occurring on U.S.
U.S. Exchange Trading
Actions
Exchanges During Class Period
During Class Period
10
9
13
9
2
11
13
7
3

34.0%
18.9%
33.0%
57.7%
46.9%
25.9%
55.7%
44.9%
28.8%

$15,949,214,351
$5,670,880,659
$10,492,435,428
$18,370,818,888
$4,326,403,591
$34,458,485,327
$7,996,092,252
$8,822,478,039
$93,065,419,489

9
11
11
7

45.8%
52.3%
73.6%
50.3%

$23,262,726,116
$27,582,826,053
$60,035,049,957
$114,094,202,060

All three cases were filed prior to Morrison’s publication.
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2015
2016
2017
Total Pre-Morrison
Total Post-Morrison

7
20
19
77
84

41.3%
56.5%
47.3%
38.5%
53.2%

$56,325,314,735
$51,426,601,031
$11,165,601,671
$17,465,819,136
$42,937,810,944

To more accurately assess this issue, we turn to a time series analysis that permits a more
precise assessment of the level of U.S. exchange trading among Cross-Listed firms during our
sample period. We present the analysis in Figure 3 which plots for each lawsuit (by date of
filing) the natural log of the dollar volume of the firm’s shares traded on a U.S. exchange
(plotted as hollow circles) as well as the natural log of the total dollar volume traded on the U.S.
exchange and its primary non-U.S. venue (plotted as solid circles). Each lawsuit thus has two
data points: a plot of its U.S. exchange dollar volume over the class period (a hollow circle) and
a plot of its total dollar volume over the class period (a solid circle). As before, we also impose a
vertical line that signifies the publication of Morrison. Finally, using these data, we estimate a
local linear regression line for the level of U.S. exchange trading before and after Morrison,
which we plot as a dashed horizontal line on either side of Morrison’s publication date. A solid
horizontal line reflects the same estimate for a defendant’s total dollar volume of trading. To
estimate these local linear regression lines, we use the triangle kernel and a bandwidth of 400
days.

15
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Figure 3:
$ Volume Traded During Class Period: Global Trades vs. US Exchange Trades
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Overall, Figure 3 provides little evidence that the composition of pre-Morrison lawsuits
would have looked substantially different had Morrison applied during this time period. As
reflected by the gap between the two fitted regression lines, the difference between a firm’s total
dollar volume of trading and its U.S. dollar volume of trading narrowed slightly after Morrison.
In theory, such a development might reflect a greater emphasis after Morrison on foreign issuers
whose equity traded primarily on a U.S. exchange, although the narrowing of this gap was also
24
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evident in the months prior to Morrison. More importantly, it is the aggregate dollar volume of
U.S. exchange trading, as opposed to the percent of U.S. exchange trading, that determines
potential damages. However, the overall level of U.S. exchange trading (reflected by the dashed
horizontal lines) reveals no notable difference before and after Morrison was decided.
We test formally whether the total level of U.S. exchange trading differed between preMorrison defendants and post-Morrison defendants by conducting an interrupted time series
analysis. For this analysis, our unit of observation is the mean dollar volume of U.S. exchange
trading each calendar quarter across the 161 Cross-Listed defendants in our sample. To account
for autocorrelation in the time series, our regression model takes the following form:
𝑌" = 𝛽% + 𝛽' 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇" + 𝛽, 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟" + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇" × 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟" + 𝜖"

(1)

where Yt is the natural log of the mean quarterly dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading for
quarter t, POST is an indicator variable set to 1 for each calendar quarter following June 2010,
Quarter is a quarter trend, and POST x Quarter is an interaction term. The parameter 𝛽' , our
main parameter of interest, estimates the change in the level of U.S. exchange trading that occurs
in the period immediately following Morrison, while 𝛽, estimates a quarterly time trend and 𝛽3
estimates any difference in the slope of the time trend following June 2010. Standard errors were
calculated using the Newey-West procedure with one lag based on Cumby-Huizinga tests for
autocorrelation.
Table 3 presents the results.
Table 3
US $ Volume
Post

1.03
(0.98)
0.001
(0.04)
0.0003
(0.05)
22.45***
(0.58)

Quarter
Post x Quarter
Constant
N
Standard errors are in parentheses

58

Both the coefficient on Post and Post x Quarter are positive, suggesting that following
Morrison, Cross-Listed defendants generally had a larger level of trading volume on U.S.
exchanges than during the pre-Morrison period. These results are consistent with Table 2, which
revealed an overall increase in the mean level of U.S. exchange trading. However, once we
account for the positive skew in the data (through the log transformation) as well as any time
trends, Table 3 indicates that any pre/post differences are statistically insignificant. Overall,
these results are consistent with the fitted regression estimates in Figure 3, which revealed no
clear evidence that the dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading during the class period was
greater following Morrison. Assuming the dollar volume of U.S. exchange trading among postMorrison defendants was necessary to incentivize a Rule 10b-5 case after Morrison, these data
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accordingly suggest there would have been sufficient incentive to bring these pre-Morrison cases
even had Morrison applied throughout our sample period.
c. How Did Dismissals and Settlements Change Post-Morrison?
Even if Morrison did not affect the type of transnational cases that had previously been
brought under Rule 10b-5, it may have had an effect on case outcomes. For instance, cases after
Morrison should generally exclude from the plaintiff class any investors who acquired their
shares on a non-U.S. venue who were often included as part of a Rule 10b-5 class prior to
Morrison. As such, it would be unsurprising if overall settlements declined as issuers faced Rule
10b-5 actions that posed lower amounts of prospective damages. At the same time, the evidence
presented in Section 2(b) indicates that plaintiffs’ attorneys and investors were already targeting
foreign issuers that had either an exclusive U.S. listing or whose U.S. exchange trading was
otherwise significant. To the extent foreign issuers faced a substantially similar Rule 10b-5 risk
before and after Morrison, it is also possible that overall settlement rates would remain the same.
Likewise, while Morrison provides a technical means to dismiss a case in which no class
members acquired any securities on a U.S. exchange, during both the pre- and post-Morrison
periods, nearly 90% of the cases in our sample filed against a Foreign Listed Firm involved a
Cross-Listed defendant. This fact suggests that, whether applying the transactional test to cases
filed before the decision or to those filed after it, outright dismissals under Morrison should be
uncommon.
To be sure, the number of observable and unobservable factors that contribute to case
outcomes naturally raise a variety of challenges for empirically identifying the effect of
Morrison. However, we nevertheless present here descriptive statistics of case outcomes to
provide an initial window into how Rule 10b-5 dismissals and settlements may have appeared to
issuers and investors, acknowledging that our analysis does not seek to identify the precise effect
of Morrison.
We first present overall dismissal rates for defendant firms within our sample that were
Foreign Listed Firms. Among these 183 lawsuits, 141 had been dismissed, settled or received a
favorable judgment by the time of our data collection. Table 4 presents the overall distribution
between cases that were dismissed and those that were settled or received a favorable judgment.
Cases are also divided into whether they were filed before or after Morrison. Overall,
approximately 49% of the pre-Morrison cases against Foreign Listed Firms had been dismissed
by the time we collected our sample, compared to 68% of the post-Morrison cases, a difference
that is statistically significant at the 5% threshold (χ (1) = 4.68, p=0.03). It is important to note,
however, that of the 73 lawsuits that remained pending at the time of our data collection, sixtyfive (90%) were filed after 2014. To the extent weaker cases are dismissed earlier than stronger
cases, the post-Morrison dismissal rate may ultimately reflect a lower rate than we currently
observe.
2

Table 4: Settlement Rates – Firms with a Non-U.S. Listing
# Dismissed
# Settle/Judgment
Pre-Morrison
42
43
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Post-Morrison

(49%)
38
(68%)

(51%)
18
(32%)

To explore whether these differential dismissal rates might be attributable to Morrison,
we examined all motions made by the defendant firms either to dismiss the case or to limit the
class of investors. Case dismissals in which a court cited Morrison were unusual. Among the
thirty-eight post-Morrison cases that were dismissed, Morrison was cited in just three cases
(8%), compared with six of the forty-two dismissals (14%) of cases that were commenced during
the pre-Morrison period. The lower incidence of dismissals citing Morrison within the postMorrison cases is, in many respects, to be expected given that plaintiffs’ counsel would be aware
of the case and should accordingly bring cases that would satisfy its transactional test. Likewise,
the higher incidence of Morrison-related dismissals of cases filed before Morrison was decided
is consistent with courts applying Morrison retroactively to cases that were presumably
structured to satisfy the more expansive conduct and effects test. In any event, the higher
dismissal rate among post-Morrison cases does not appear to reflect the failure of these cases to
include at least some investors that could satisfy its transactional test.
While not appearing to affect outright dismissal rates, the Morrison decision does appear
to have been actively deployed to dismiss class members who could not demonstrate that they
acquired their securities on a U.S. exchange. This was particularly true for pre-Morrison cases
involving a global class of investors, many of whom purchased securities in the defendant firm
on non-US venues. Following Morrison, such cases could have been subject to a partial motion
to dismiss that, if granted, had the effect of limiting the plaintiff class to investors who purchased
their securities in the United States. Among the 87 pre-Morrison cases against a Foreign Listed
Firm, we observe 15 motions to limit the class on this basis. All were granted by the court, citing
Morrison. This compares to just three such motions among the 96 cases against a Foreign Listed
Firm in our post-Morrison sample, no doubt reflecting efforts by plaintiffs’ counsel to define an
investor class that satisfied Morrison.
Used in this fashion, Morrison could accordingly affect settlement outcomes even for
those cases that survived a motion to dismiss. As noted previously, the Vivendi case presented a
particularly striking example of this scenario. The lawsuit, which had the prospect of being the
largest securities fraud class action ever, resulted in a partial dismissal after the Morrison
decision, limiting the class to holders of U.S. ADRs acquired on the New York Stock Exchange.
However, less than 10% of Vivendi’s global trading volume was in the U.S. ADR market. While
original damages in Vivendi were estimated at $9 billion, following dismissal of investors who
acquired Vivendi securities outside the U.S., the case settled for just $76 million in total.
Yet, it is also important to note that the success of these motions after Morrison does not
necessarily signal a more hostile environment for class action suits against foreign firms. As
noted previously, global class actions were relatively rare even prior to Morrison, and courts
frequently dismissed claims based on foreign transactions even under the prior conduct and
effects test. For example, Hannah Buxbaum studied a ten-year sample of multinational class
actions between 1996 and 2005 and found that less than 40% of the cases encompassed claims
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based on foreign transactions. Moreover, of those cases (45), only a third were allowed to
proceed with a class that included any claims based on non-U.S. market transactions. These
findings underscore a more general observation that, compared to Morrison’s transactional test,
the judicial discretion created by the conduct and effects test gave defense counsel broad scope
for challenging the composition of an investor class on the basis that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over non-US defendants. For instance, among the 87 pre-Morrison cases
against a Foreign Listed Firm, courts granted motions to limit the case in twenty-two (excluding
the fifteen noted previously where the courts cited Morrison). Thus, even before Morrison, the
conduct and effects test provided defense counsel with an opportunity to limit the size of a global
class action.
99

100

101

To examine more precisely the extent to which Morrison may have been associated with
a secular decline in settlement amounts, we analyze settlement proceeds for all lawsuits within
our sample for which we were able to obtain data. In Figure 4, we present a scatter plot of the
natural log of settlements paid (in $ thousands) per settled case, sorted by the date of the
complaint. As with Figure 3, we supplement this scatter plot with local linear regression lines to
highlight any pre-Morrison and post-Morrison trends.102 Consistent with our prior analyses, we
limit settlements in Figure 4 to those against Foreign Listed Firms, and all dollar figures have
been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices.

99

Buxbaum, supra note 59, at 39.
Id. at 40.
101
See, e.g., In re: China Life Securities Litigation, 04 Civ 2112, Sept. 3, 2008 (SDNY) (finding subject matter
jurisdiction under the “effects” test for U.S. residents acquiring shares of China Life stock on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange but declining to find subject matter jurisdiction under either the conduct or effects test for non-US
purchasers).
102
In estimating these models, we use the same regression specification utilized in Figure 2.
100
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Figure 4:
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As shown in Figure 4, aggregate settlement payments varied widely across cases both
before and after Morrison. Prior to Morrison, settlement proceeds (in 2018 dollars) ranged from
a low of $749,000 in a 2002 suit commenced against Synsorb Biotech, Inc., to a high of $1.4
billion in a 2003 suit against Royal Ahold Corporation. The years after Morrison witnessed
settlement payments that were similarly varied. Overall, settlement payments in our postMorrison sample ranged from a low of approximately $1 million paid by the Liberty Silver
Corporation to a high of $3 billion paid by Petrobras Brasileiro S.A. Overall, the median
settlement payment in the pre-Morrison sample was $13.25 million, compared to a statistically
indistinguishably different amount of $15.16 million in the post-Morrison sample. 103 Visual
inspection of Figure 4 likewise reveals no evident change in settlement proceeds following
Morrison.
The absence of any significant difference in overall settlement amounts for pre- and postMorrison cases distinguishes our findings from those of Professor Guseva who found a
statistically significant decline in settlement proceeds following Morrison. We attribute this
difference to the fact that our analyses have focused on Foreign Listed Firms, given that these
firms were most directly affected by Morrison. In contrast, the Guseva sample also includes
firms that, while headquartered overseas, have their securities solely listed on a U.S. exchange,
This selection choice, however, has the potential to confound a post-Morrison analysis of
settlement proceeds for several reasons. First, as noted previously, the years following 2005
witnessed a steady increase in the number of 10b-5 actions against firms headquartered in China,
with these suits constituting over 60% of 10b-5 lawsuits against foreign firms in 2010 and 2011.
Second, these firms generally traded exclusively on U.S. exchanges, meaning that investors in
these cases would satisfy Morrison. Consistent with this claim, none of the 94 post-Morrison
103

A Wilcoxon rank-sum test of medians yields a test statistic of -0.368, p=0.7127.
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cases in our sample that involved a defendant headquartered in China was subject to either a
motion to limit the class or a motion to dismiss that was based on Morrison. Finally, trading
volume in these firms was generally low relative to Foreign Listed Firms given that they
generally had lower market capitalizations. For instance, the mean U.S. dollar volume of trading
among these firms across the sample period was approximately $12.8 million, compared to $24.7
million for Foreign Listed Firms. As a result, settlement amounts in these cases should be
expected to be lower, causing their large representation within the post-Morrison sample to drive
down mean settlement proceeds following the decision.
To highlight the potential for these firms to bias the analysis of post-Morrison settlement
proceeds, we present in Figure 5 the median settlement value by year of complaint, both for the
full sample of defendant issuers (including all Chinese issuers) as well as for all issuers that met
our definition of a Foreign Listed Firm. As shown in the figure, median settlement amounts for
the full sample spike sharply in 2009104 and decline considerably for cases filed in 2010-2016.
However, for Rule 10b-5 suits involving Foreign Listed Firms, median settlement values for
cases filed between 2010 and 2014 generally resemble those for cases filed between 2004-2008,
with overall median settlement amounts showing no statistically significant difference between
the pre- and post-Morrison periods. In contrast, median settlement amounts for all firms in the
sample decreased from $11 million for cases filed prior to Morrison to $3.2 million for those
filed after it, with a Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejecting the hypothesis of equal medians (z=3.301,
p<.01). Overall, these results suggest that Professor Guseva’s finding that settlement amounts
declined following Morrison may have been driven by the inclusion in her sample of the large
number of 10b-5 cases commenced against Chinese based issuers in the time period following
Morrison.

104

The spike in median settlement amounts in 2009 reflects the fact that 2009 cases resulted in just two settlements,
one of which was a $150 million settlement in the Satyam Computer Services litigation.
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Figure 5: Median Settlement Amounts by Year of Complaint
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d. Morrison and Attorneys’ Fees
Finally, we also collect where possible data concerning the payment of fees paid to class
counsel to identify any general patterns in the payment of fees for cases within our sample. In
total, we find data concerning these fee awards in 149 of our cases, of which 55 were filed
against Foreign Listed Firms. As with our analysis of settlement data, we present here only
descriptive statistics of fee awards to enable a better understanding of how fee payments may
have appeared to plaintiffs’ attorneys during our sample period.
In Figure 6, we present a scatter plot of fees paid per settled case, based on the date of the
complaint. As in Figure 3, we present dollar values (in $ thousands) in logs, sorted by the date of
the complaint, and all dollar figures have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices.
Consistent with our prior analyses, we limit our analysis of fees to those against Foreign Listed
Firms.
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Figure 6:
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Not surprisingly, the large settlements related to the Royal Ahold NV litigation
(commenced in 2003) and the Petroleo Brasileiro (commenced in 2014) also resulted in usually
large fee awards of nearly $130 million and $285 million, respectively, to class counsel. As with
Figure 3, we supplement this scatter plot with local linear regression lines to highlight any preMorrison and post-Morrison trends using the same specification discussed there.105 In general,
the data regarding fee awards generally tracks that of settlement amounts: Fee awards during our
sample period are highly varied by case, with the local linear estimates showing no evidence of
an increase or decrease in fees following Morrison.
Following our analysis of settlement amounts, we also assess separately median fee
awards across years, calculating medians separately for Foreign Listed Firms, as well as for all
non-US defendants including those that trade exclusively on a U.S. venue. Figure 7 presents the
results.

105

All dollar figures have been inflation adjusted to reflect 2018 prices.
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Again, the results resemble those presented for settlement amounts in the sample.
Aggregating all cases together, median fees generally declined in the years following Morrison.
Specifically, among all lawsuits (including those filed against Chinese issuers), median fee
awards in our sample of cases decreased from $2.3 million for cases filed prior to Morrison to
$882,000 for those filed after it (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z=2.58, p<.01). This decline, however,
was driven primarily by lower fee awards in cases filed against firms headquartered in China.
For instance, among cases filed after Morrison, median fee awards for cases filed against firms
headquartered in China was $570,000. Overall, focusing on Foreign Listed Firms reveals that
median fee awards actually increased from $2.8 million for cases filed prior to Morrison to $4.4
million for cases filed after it, although the difference was statistically insignificant (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test: z=-0.794, ns). As with our findings regarding settlement amounts, these results
provide little evidence to suggest that Morrison is associated with a change in fees awarded to
class counsel. Our findings further underscore the need to account for the large number of
Chinese defendant issuers in 10b-5 cases in the years following Morrison.
III.

Implications

A. Morrison’s True Effect
Our empirical analysis shows that Morrison did not dramatically change litigation from the
pre-Morrison period. The same types of issuers were sued both before and after Morrison with
roughly the same frequency. Nor did Morrison appear to change the overall results in those
cases – although post-Morrison foreign plaintiffs were more systematically excluded from
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plaintiff classes, settlement rates and amounts remained largely unchanged as did attorneys’ fee
awards.106 In sum, Morrison did not transform securities fraud litigation as it existed in 2010.
Similarly, Morrison was not really about changing the exposure of foreign issuers to U.S.
litigation.107 As our data show, both before and after Morrison almost every foreign issuer that
was sued had a U.S. exchange listing. Accordingly, the Morrison decision does not appear to
reduce the prospect that a foreign issuer will be sued based on its exposure to the U.S. market
through a secondary listing.
As our data show, prior to Morrison, plaintiffs were not using securities class actions to
target issuers with no connection to the U.S. capital markets, presumably because the conduct
and effects tests were generally effective at weeding out those cases and leading to outcomes
similar to that as Morrison. Indeed, Morrison was itself dismissed under the old Second Circuit
test. In our data set prior to Morrison there were 20 motions to limit a class under this test, 19 of
which were granted.
The conclusion that Morrison did not critically change existing practice is, however, only
part of the story. Morrison drastically curtailed the potential expansion of U.S. securities
litigation by foreclosing the threatened global class action.108 In particular, Morrison prevented
plaintiffs from using the existence of a U.S. listing to bring a class action on behalf of a
worldwide plaintiff class, a plaintiff class that might substantially exceed the issuer’s presence in
the U.S. capital markets. Vivendi was the poster child for this potential expansion and, to the
extent that cases like Vivendi were the motivation for Morrison, Morrison was a success.
Putting Morrison’s true effect into context in part explains prior empirical tests of Morrison.
Professor Robert Bartlett found that institutional investors did not initially adjust their conduct to
Morrison, instead preferring to continue to invest abroad.109 When the non-impact of Morrison
is highlighted, Professor Bartlett’s results jibe with the fact that Morrison appears to be largely
consistent with past practices followed by the courts that had used the conduct and effects
106
Our data on both filings and fee awards suggest that Morrison did not affect the incentives for plaintiffs’
lawyers to bring litigation against foreign issuers. Instead, plaintiffs’ law firms continued their old practices as
Morrison walled off a section of litigation that they had not been targeting beforehand. In Appendix A we examine
the composition of plaintiffs’ firms that litigated cases involving foreign issues both pre-and post-Morrison. The
composition of law firms involved in these cases does not appear to change significantly with four firms remaining
in the top ten in both periods. Robbins Geller, for example, maintained a high-volume securities fraud practice
against foreign private issuers post-Morrison with 12 cases pre-Morrison and 10 cases post-Morrison. There are
also a number of smaller firms in these tables, highlighting that this is a diverse practice with likely low barriers to
entry. We note that Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman subsequently changed its name to Milberg Weiss and
disappeared from the top five ranking post-Morrison. Milberg was the lead plaintiffs’ lawyers in the securities fraud
action against Vivendi. Milberg’s practice was affected by the criminal convictions of its founders Melvyn Weiss
and William Lerach. See Jonathan D. Glater, Class-Action Lawyer Gets 30 Months in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/business/03legal.html (describing Weiss and Lerach’s convictions).
107
See, e.g., Alex Reed, But I'm an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared Securities Fraud
Claims after Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 515 (2012) (analyzing the Morrison
decision’s effect on F-Squared Cases)
108
See, e.g., Cravath, Swaine & Moore, supra note 66 (“By clearly barring “f-cubed” lawsuits, Morrison has cut
short a growing trend in recent years in which plaintiffs’ lawyers have attempted to use the class action mechanism
to seek large recoveries on behalf of foreign plaintiffs with no connection to the United States.”)
109
Bartlett, supra note 32, at 186-87.
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tests.110 Instead, it appears that institutional investors may not have valued securities fraud
protections both pre- and post- Morrison, instead preferring the value of lower costs and greater
liquidity by purchasing ordinary shares on the issuers’ primary exchange. Moreover, to the
extent that other studies found that Morrison had a price impact, this impact would appear to be a
consequence of a reduced possibility that these firms would be subject to Rule 10b-5 litigation in
the future. This mitigates towards supporting the findings of LPSL who found that US-listed
foreign firms experienced insignificant or even positive abnormal returns in both markets,
particularly firms having most of their equity traded outside the U.S.111
This does not mean that Morrison had no effect in terms of litigation results. Morrison
eliminated the global class action. In the wake of Morrison there were 18 cases which had a
portion of their classes dismissed. This included significant judgments such as the $9 billion
Vivendi class action and class actions involving BP Plc, Sanofi-Aventis and UBS.112 These prior
cases had been allowed to proceed under the old Second Circuit conduct and effects tests or
variations thereof in other Circuits or had yet to be subject to a motion to limit class brought
under the old test. Thus, Morrison reduced the potential scope of litigation against Foreign Listed
Firms. Recognizing this can help us understand Morrison’s true significance.
B. Toward a better Understanding of Morrison
1. Morrison’s place in Balancing U.S. Securities Regulation of Foreign Issuers
By requiring that plaintiffs in a suit against a Foreign Listed Firm trade their securities in the
U.S. markets, Morrison has the effect of tying a foreign issuer’s liability exposure to the extent
of its capital markets presence in the United States. Under Morrison, if an issuer engages in
securities fraud, the size of a potential plaintiff class that can bring suit under U.S. law is directly
proportional to the number of shares that are traded in the U.S. markets. Foreign issuers that
raise capital in the U.S. markets or facilitate broad secondary trading of their securities will have
greater liability exposure.
This proportional exposure is consistent with the delicate balance that Congress and the SEC
have drawn to regulate foreign issuers that participate in the U.S. capital markets while
respecting the sovereign interests of their home regulator. Prior to Morrison, the SEC adopted
several regulatory boundaries that distinguished between foreign and domestic issuers. The
SEC’s rules were designed to attract foreign issuers to the U.S. capital markets while limiting the
regulatory burden imposed on those issuers by U.S. law.

110

See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. Professor Bartlett’s results are also consistent with the argument
by some commentators that securities fraud litigation provides limited value to diversified institutional investors
who are equally likely to lose as to gain from a successful securities fraud suit. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 304 (2007) (arguing that securities fraud litigation
primarily transfers wealth among diversified investors).
111
Licht, et al., supra note 83, at 330.
112
See generally Conway, supra note 11; Edward Greene & Arpan Patel, Consequences of Morrison v. NAB,
securities litigation and beyond, 11(2) CAP. MARK’T J. 145 (2016).
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Starting in the 1980s, the SEC adopted a rule of substituted compliance for foreign issuers
whose securities traded primarily outside the United States.113 These issuers, known as foreign
private issuers, are subject to the law of their home country for the bulk of their regulation.114
Accordingly, foreign private issuers are exempt from the obligation to file quarterly reports and
proxy statements, need not comply with Section 16 reporting requirements,115 and do not need to
prepare financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP.116 The rule of substituted
compliance, in most cases, allows issuers in most cases to substitute compliance with the
disclosure obligations imposed by their home jurisdiction rather than comply with U.S.
disclosure requirements. For periodic reporting the SEC explicitly adopted a rule that an issuer
need only furnish rather than file certain reports filed with home country regulators reducing the
scope of liability for these reports.117
The result was to create a parallel regime for foreign private issuers that was significantly
less regulated than domestic issuers.118 The justification was in part reality – foreign issuers did
not prepare quarterly reports in many jurisdictions or have US GAAP-compliant financials – but
was also motivated by competitive reasons.119 The U.S. did not want to significantly overburden
these foreign companies so that they would no longer desire to list in the United States.120 And
the overarching justification for this was substituted compliance, the notion that it was better to
let the home country regulator address disclosure issues for foreign issuers.121
The SEC also adopted Regulation S to provide safe harbor exemptive relief for foreign firms
that did not list their securities in the United States, enumerating the circumstances under which
those firms would not be subject to the U.S. registration requirements when they raised capital,
despite the global nature of the securities markets.122 The SEC went even further with Rule
144A, which allows foreign issuers to issue securities to institutional investors in the United
113

See generally Howell E. Jackson, Jr., Substituted Compliance: The Emergence, Substituted Compliance: The
Emergence, Challenges, and Evolution of a New Regulatory Paradigm, 1 J. FIN. REG. 169, 171-175 (2015) (tracing
the history of the SEC’s approach and implementation of a substituted compliance regime).
114
See supra note 12 for a discussion of the definition of “foreign private issuer”.
115
See 17 C.F.R. §240.3a12-3 (2018) (“Exemption from sections 14(a), 14(b), 14(c), 14(f) and 16 for securities of
certain foreign issuers”).
116
Securities and Exchange Commission, Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements
Prepared In Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation To U.S. GAAP,
Release Nos. 33-8879; 34-57026; International Series Release No. 1306; File No. S7-13-07 (Eff. March 4, 2008).
117
See Report Of Foreign Private Issuer Pursuant To Rule 13a-16 Or 15d-16 Under The Securities Exchange Act
Of 1934, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form6-k.pdf. See also §240.13a-13 (exemption from Form
10-Q quarterly reporting requirements); Id. §§243.100-.103 (exemption from Regulation FD).
118
See generally Securities and Exchange Commission, Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets — A Brief Overview for
Foreign Private Issuers, Feb. 13, 2013, available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/foreign-privateissuers-overview.shtml.
119
See generally Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. LAW REV. 89, 130-133
(2007) (detailing the lower regulatory regime for foreign private issuers adopted by the SEC); EDWARD F. GREENE
ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS chs. 2, 6 (7th ed. 2004)
(delineating the regulation applicable to global issuers who raise capital in the U.S. markets).
120
See Accessing the U.S. Capital Markets, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (“The Commission has
adopted specific rules applicable to foreign private issuers that are designed to recognize international and home
jurisdiction standards.”)
121
Id.; see also Jackson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
122
For a description of Regulation S, see Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-90
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990).
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States without having to list them on a U.S. exchange or comply with the registration
requirements and allows those institutions to resell the securities freely to other institutional
investors.123 Rule 144A is understood as creating a sophisticated institutional market for players
that can fend for themselves both with respect to the disclosure they seek from an issuer and the
extent to which they seek additional regulatory protection.
These regulations incorporate several key regulatory principles. First, U.S. regulation should
not interfere with the policies of a foreign issuer’s primary regulator. Second, the manner and
scope of U.S. regulation should be based on the extent to which the foreign issuer participates in
the U.S. capital markets. Third, the need for regulatory protection is greater with respect to
investors that are not able to fend for themselves.
Morrison takes an analogous approach. When issuers use the U.S. capital markets by selling
or allowing their securities to be traded in the United States, Morrison dictates that investors
have the benefit of U.S. law, similar to the SEC’s rules regarding foreign private issuers. At the
same time, Morrison provides a light touch – extending that protection only to U.S. transactions.
The scope of liability post-Morrison also has the virtue of aligning with investment patterns.
Retail investors, those who need the most protection, do not extensively invest abroad.
Meanwhile, institutional investors have the sophistication that enables them to make a choice
between continuing their practice of investing abroad in cases in which they do not require the
direct protection of Rule 10b-5 or incurring the higher cost of trading on a U.S. exchange.
To a degree, the rule adopted in Morrison is even more nuanced than the general system of
substituted compliance since a Foreign Listed Firm’s liability exposure is directly proportional to
its use of the U.S. capital markets. Post-Morrison, a number of lower court cases have
considered the issuer’s purposeful availment of the U.S. markets as a key factor in determining
whether the case could be maintained. For example, in In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg.,
Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig.,124 the court concluded that Volkswagen’s level one
ADRs, which were not listed on an exchange but traded in the over-the-counter market,
nonetheless met the definition of domestic securities transactions under Morrison. In so doing,
the court emphasized the fact that “Volkswagen took affirmative steps to make its securities
available to investors here in the United States.”125 The court in Vancouver Alumni Asset
Holdings Inc. v. Daimler AG,126 similarly found that Daimler “sought to avail itself of the
American securities market [where it] actively and voluntarily contracted with an American
depository bank to sell ADRs to American investors.”127
The theory that an issuer’s exposure to private liability should be proportionate to the market
impact of its conduct is not limited to foreign issuers. Rather the concept has its roots in the
express liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 – sections 11 and 12. Both provisions
distinguish between the impact of fraudulent misrepresentations on the direct participants in an
123

17 C.F.R. §230.144A (1991); see also Resale of Restricted Securities, Changes to Method of Determining
Holding Period of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-6862 [1989-90
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,523, at 80, 641-42 (Apr. 23, 1990).
124
In re Volkswagen "Clean Diesel" Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig. (N.D. Cal. 2017).
125
Id. at *813.
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2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83621 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
127
Id. at *21.
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offering from the effect of those statements on the market as a whole. In both cases, only direct
participants have standing to bring a private claim. Section 11 imposes this limitation through
the tracing requirement, which courts have interpreted to require a plaintiff to demonstrate that
the securities he or she purchased can be traced directly to the fraudulent offering.128 Section 12
does so by requiring privity – an investor can only recover from his or her direct seller and those
who actively solicited the investment.129 In addition, the 1933 Act expressly limits the exposure
of underwriting participants by capping damages at the offering price130 As the courts have
recognized, Congress’ purpose in establishing these limits was to maintain proportionality
between a defendants’ potential liability and its role in the offering.131
Maintaining a proportionality between liability exposure and market impact allows offering
participants to evaluate the potential consequences of their behavior, to engage in an informed
cost-benefit analysis about the level of care that they devote to ensuring the integrity of their
disclosures and to price their liability risk accurately. These same considerations are applicable
to a foreign issuer’s decision to cross-list its securities. Thus, Morrison enables an issuer to
weigh the value from listing in the U.S. markets in terms of access to capital, increased liquidity
and potential quality signaling, against the cost of liability exposure and, importantly, to avoid
extensive liability exposure based on a minimal market presence.
This understanding of Morrison bears on an issue that has received inconsistent treatment
from the courts in both the pre- and post-Morrison periods, the ability of purchasers of a foreign
firms ADRs that trade only in the U.S. OTC market to bring antifraud claims. In contrast to
cases such as Volkswagen and Daimler, cases such as Fortis (a pre-Morrison case) and Société
Générale (a post-Morrison case) dismissed claims made by holders of these ADRs on the basis
that they were “predominantly foreign.” The proportionality interpretation of Morrison that we
advance here suggests that such a cavalier assessment of whether Rule 10b-5 applies to these
investors misses the key question courts should be asking. In particular, the issue in these cases is
not whether an ADR transaction is predominantly foreign or domestic, but whether the existence
of trading in the U.S. OTC market reflects the efforts of the issuer to obtain access to the U.S.
capital markets.132 To the extent that an issuer has purposefully availed itself of the U.S. capital
markets by sponsoring or assisting in the sale of U.S. ADRs, that issuer should face antifraud
liability to investors who purchase those ADRs within the United States.
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See, e.g., In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that the tracing
requirement is the condition Congress has imposed for granting access to the "relaxed liability requirement [section]
11 affords"); Krim v. PCOrder.com, 402 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Aftermarket purchasers seeking standing
must demonstrate the ability to "trace' their shares to the faulty registration.");
129
See Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, 75
WASH. L. REV. 429, 440 (2000) (“The privity requirement limits access to section 12(a)(2)'s remedy and has allowed
some courts to find that privity alone limits access to the remedy”). Some commentators have argued that courts
have eroded the privity requirement. See, e.g., Bryan M. Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: The
Privity Requirement in The Contemporary Securities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L. REV. 235 (1984) (arguing the
courts have expanded the scope of 12(a)(2) liability beyond what the statute should cover).
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See § 11(g) ("In no case shall the amount recoverable under this section exceed the price at which the security
was offered to the public,")
131
See, e.g., Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967) (observing also that a shareholder’s recovery could be
diluted if the scope of potential plaintiffs were expanded).
132
As discussed in note 28, ADRs can be sponsored or unsponsored by the issuer.
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2. Morrison and the Extraterritorial Application of Federal Statutes
In a series of cases after Morison addressing jurisdictional issues, the Supreme Court has
drawn bright, foreclosing lines to prevent U.S. exercise of jurisdiction abroad. These cases were
put forth as an issue of comity and sovereignty as well as judicial resources. But they all were
decided on a more doctrinal point: The U.S. as a matter of international norms and laws should
not be exercising jurisdiction over foreign matters without express Congressional intent.
The Morrison decision rests at the core of these cases. Subsequent courts have cited
Morrison as the “leading case on extraterritoriality.”133 As the Supreme Court later explained, its
holding in Morrison, combined with its decision in RJR Nabisco v. European Community,134
produced “a two-step framework for deciding questions of extraterritoriality.”135 Step one asks
“whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted.”136 Quoting Morrison,
the Court explained that it can be rebutted “only if the text provides a ‘clear indication of an
extraterritorial application.’”137 Step two asks “’whether the case involves a domestic
application of the statute.’”138 The Court explained the resulting framework as consistent with
“the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns in mind.”139
This rationale led the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell, to conclude that the
Alien Tort Claim Act does not apply extraterritorially.140 Quoting Morrison, the Court explained
“[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”141
Similarly, although the Court in Daimler AG v. Bauman et al. rejected the plaintiff’s claims
largely on jurisdictional grounds, concluding that Daimler’s contacts with California were
insufficient to subject it to general personal jurisdiction, the Court also observed “Recent
decisions of this Court, however, have rendered plaintiffs’ ATS and TVPA claims infirm.”142
Lower courts have taken the Supreme Court at its word and, similarly, have applied Morrison
to endorse a restrictive test for determining whether legislation should be applied
extraterritorially. For example, in Microsoft Corp. v. United States, the Second Circuit followed
the approach in Morrison to conclude that the Stored Communications Act does not apply
extraterritorially and, as a result, did not authorize U.S. courts to issue and enforce warrants for
the seizure of electronic information that is stored exclusively on foreign servers.143 In Cedeño,
the court extended Morrison’s reasoning to the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
133

United States v. Hussain, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178675, *4-6 (N.D.Cal.).
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
135
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2018).
136
Id. at 2136, citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. ___, ___, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 195 L. Ed. 2d
476, 493 (2016).
137
Id. citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. 247, 255, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 177 L. Ed. 2d 535
(2010).
138
Id. citing RJR Nabisco, 579 U. S., at ___, 136 S. Ct. 2090, 195 L. Ed. 2d 476, 493.
139
Id. citing Smith v. United States, 507 U. S. 197, 204, n. 5, 113 S. Ct. 1178, 122 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1993)
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U. S. 108, 124 (2012).
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Id. at 115.
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Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 141 (2014).
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Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated by United States v. Microsoft Corp., 2018
U.S. LEXIS 2495 (U.S., Apr. 17, 2018).
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Organizations Act. Judge Rakoff explained that “[a]lthough Morrison does not address the
RICO statute, its reasoning is dispositive here.”144 Similarly, the court in Loginovskaya v.
Batratchenko concluded that Morrison’s transaction test applied to antifraud claims under the
Commodities Exchange Act145 and that “prior CEA case law addressing extraterritoriality has
seemingly been abrogated by Morrison.”146 And in Spizz v. Goldfarb Seligman & Co. the Court
held that the avoidance provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code do not apply extraterritorially
and therefore could not be used to avoid an allegedly fraudulent transfer that occurred in
Israel.147
As these cases illustrate, Morrison has been broadly read to endorse a restrictive test for
determining whether legislation should be applied extraterritorially. The problem with this
reading is that Morrison is not properly understood as a case about extraterritoriality, despite the
Court’s characterization of its holding. Although the Court in Morrison purported to speak
about the “the extraterritorial application of § 10(b),” 148 our results demonstrate that the
Morrison rule has the effect of applying § 10(b) to fraudulent conduct both within and outside
the United States so long as the plaintiff purchased his or her shares in the U.S. markets.
Morrison put in context thus is not, in fact, a case about the scope of foreign conduct that can
give rise to liability under U.S. law; rather it is properly understood as a standing case. Our
results show that the effect of the Morrison rule is to allow the U.S. antifraud provision to reach
fraudulent conduct that takes place outside the United States. Morrison, however, limits those
who can assert a violation to investors who have traded in the U.S. markets. Morrison is
therefore a foreclosing case, but a case about foreclosing the scope of permissible plaintiffs, not
the scope of potential defendants.149 Whatever the Court’s views about the appropriate scope of
144

Cedeño v. Intech Group, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See also Norex Petroleum Ltd. v.
Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Morrison's presumption of extraterritoriality
applies to the RICO statute).
145
Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
146
Id. at 368.
147
562 B.R. 601, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. January 9, 2017)
148
Morrison at 254.
149
This aspect of Morrison may be criticized to the extent that it reduces the scope of legal protection available to
U.S. investors by limiting their ability to recover damages when they are defrauded in connection with securities
trades that do not take place on a U.S. exchange. As Professor Bartlett noted, after Morrison the institutional
investor community warned that, “to maintain global diversification while retaining the same antifraud protection
existing before Morrison, institutional investors may seek to move their international holdings from shares
purchased and sold on foreign exchanges to ADRs traded on domestic exchanges.” Bartlett, supra note 32, at 185
citing Christian J. Ward & J. Campbell Barker, Morrison v. National Australia Bank: The Impact on Institutional
Investors, Council of Institutional Investors, at 12 (2012), available at
http://www.cii.org/files/publications/governance_ basics/Report_Morrison_v_National_Australia_Bank.pdf. Id. at
186-87. We note, however, that commentators have questioned the extent to which private securities fraud litigation
effectively compensates injured investors. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform:
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 19n-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301,
1312-1313 (2008) (“Rule 10b-5 class actions fail to provide meaningful compensation to the class members on
whose behalf they are brought”).To the extent that the primary objective of private securities fraud litigation is
deterrence rather than compensation, eliminating the ability of some investors to sue does not necessary undermine
that goal. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009
WISC. L. REV. 297; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The "Innocent Shareholder": An Essay on Compensation and Deterrence
in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 243.
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federal legislation, the Morrison test is inconsistent with a narrow application of that legislation
to domestic conduct.
Conclusion
Morrison has been hailed as substantially changing the risk of suit for foreign issuers. This at
least is the legend of Morrison. Our empirical analysis however, changes this assessment. We
find that Morrison did not change litigation rates, settlements, or attorney’s fees. Moreover, our
empirical analysis shows that lawyers targeted the same type of foreign issuers both pre-and
post-Morrison in terms of volume.
Instead Morrison is best viewed as a preemptive rule – addressing and foreclosing the
possible rise of global class actions for U.S.-listed foreign issuers exemplified by Vivendi and
providing clarity that the liability exposure for foreign issuers would be proportional to their
presence in the U.S. capital markets. At the same time, Morrison preserved the protection of the
U.S. securities laws for investors who purchase the securities of foreign investors in the U.S.
markets, even for fraudulent conduct that arguably occurs abroad.
Ultimately, when put in its proper context based on the data, Morrison’s holding was
consistent with longstanding SEC practices to subject foreign issuers to jurisdiction for their U.S.
actions but at the same time to leave substantial parts of the regulation of these issuers to their
home jurisdiction. Morrison was also consistent with the overall structure of the federal
securities laws which limit the liability exposure of market participants based on the impact of
their conduct. Put in this context Morrison is not a foreclosing case, but a case about defining
permissible plaintiffs. It was not about the location of defendants. It was a case about standing
and not extraterritoriality.
In other words, Morrison was not so much a game-changer but a simple application of
longstanding principles with limited consequences. As a result, our findings that its effect was
modest should not be surprising.
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Appendix A: LEGAL COUNSEL RANKINGS
Pre-Morrison Rankings
1 Entwistle & Cappucci, LLP
2 Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman, LLP
3 Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP
4 Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, PLLC
5 Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP
6 Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
7 Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, PC
8 Law Offices of Jan Meyer & Associates, PC
9 Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd LLP
10 Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross, LLP

Attorneys' Fees
$130,648
$62,466
$42,488
$38,363
$49,780
$25,170
$20,070
$30,000
$15,221
$9,000

Settlements
$1,100,000
$323,300
$239,350
$185,300
$179,608
$108,675
$95,100
$89,508
$81,605
$75,000

#
Cases
1
13
4
7
6
9
2
1
12
1

Post-Morrison Rankings
1 Labaton Sucharow LLP
2 Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP
3 Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann, LLP
4 Robbins, Geller, Rudman & Dowd LLP
5 Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A.
6 Bleichmar Fonti Tountas & Auld, LLP
7 Saxena White, P.A.
8 Scott & Scott, LLP
9 Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifshitz, LLP
10 Pomerantz Grossman Hufford Dahlstrom & Gross, LLP

Attorneys' Fees
$66,012
$52,710
$35,473
$51,079
$27,450
$25,137
$29,625
$22,065
$15,025
$3,500

Settlements
$345,500
$258,200
$229,950
$207,600
$157,450
$120,000
$94,000
$80,235
$53,500
$37,500

#
Cases
5
6
5
10
2
1
4
2
2
2

The composition of law firms both pre- and post-Morrison does not appear to change
significantly. Prior to Morrison, five law firms are top law firms as defined by Professors
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Krishnan, Solomon and Thomas.150 Post Morrison, there are also five law firms in this defined
ranking. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman subsequently changed its name to Milberg Weiss
and disappeared from the top five ranking post-Morrison. Notably Milberg was the lead
plaintiffs’ lawyers in the securities fraud action against the foreign private issuer Vivendi. This
case resulted in a judgement with potential liability of $9 billion which was mostly eliminated as
a result of Morrison. This case is not included in this table as it is one of the few securities fraud
litigations to ever result in a judgement after trial. Robbins Geller maintained a high volume
securities fraud practice against foreign private issuers post-Morrison with 12 cases preMorrison and 10 cases post-Morrison. There are also a number of smaller firms in these tables,
highlighting that this is a diverse practice with likely low barriers to entry.

150

CNV Krishanan, Randall Thomas & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Who are the Top Law Firms? Assessing the
Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18(1) AM. LAW AND ECON. REV. 122 (2016).
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